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INTRODUCTION

Our constitutional law of capital sentencing does not understand
Shakespeare's "gentle rain from heaven."' Mercy confuses and befud-

dles it. The jury that sentenced Albert Brown to death was instructed
t Assistant Professor, Cornell Law School. B.A., Colgate University, 1987; M.Phil.,
Oxford University, 1989;J.D., Yale University, 1992. The author wishes to thank Gregory
Alexander, John Blume, John Bueker, Steven Clymer, Joshua Dressier, Marc Fajer, Robert
Green, Samuel Gross, Arthur Jacobson, Sheri Johnson, Lily Kahng, Michael Meltsner,
Larry Palmer, Samuel Pillsbury, Seana Shiffrin, Steven Shiffrin, John Siliciano, Gary Simson, Katherine Stone, Scott Sundby, Robert Weisberg, Welsh White, and Franklin Zimring
for comments on one version or another of an earlier draft of this Article. While the
author deserves blame for any errors, mistakes, or lapses ofjudgment, have mercy.
I The quality of mercy is not strained. / It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven /
Upon the place beneath. It is twice blest: / It blesseth him that gives and him that
takes.... / It is an attribute to God himself, / And earthly power doth then show likest
God's / When mercy seasons justice. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act
4, sc. 1.
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that "'mere... sympathy"' should not play on its judgment. 2 Brown
claimed this instruction violated his Eighth Amendment rights, but
the Supreme Court disagreed. 3 Justice Blackmun dissented, worried
that some jurors might think the instruction denied them the power
to grant mercy. That power, he thought, played a "special role" in
capital sentencing. 4 Some five years later, Justice Scalia dissented
when the Court reversed Derrick Morgan's death sentence. 5 Morgan
won a new sentencing hearing because one of the jurors believed
Morgan, if convicted of capital murder, should be sentenced to death
no matter what evidence he presented in mitigation.6 According to
Justice Scalia, the Court had held that no "merciless" juror could sit in
judgment of a capital defendant. The Constitution, he thought, de7
manded no such thing.
These dissents, one embracing mercy and the other rejecting it,
reflect a basic confusion about the role of mercy in Eighth Amendmentjurisprudence.8 We lack an adequate account of what mercy is

2

California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 539 (1987), cert. denied 115 S.Ct. 138 (1994).

Id.
Id. at 563 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
5 Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 739 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 729.
7 Id. at 752 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Not only must mercy be allowed, but now only
the merciful may be permitted to sit in judgment. ... In my view, that not only is not
required by the Constitution of the United States; it grossly offends it.").
8 The Court's members tend to use the concept of mercy without great care. See, e.g.,
Wills v. Texas, 114 S. Ct. 1867, 1868 (1994) (Blackmun,J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari); Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
the denial of certiorari); Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 275 (1993); Graham v. Collins, 506
U.S. 461, 494 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring); Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 750-51
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 175-76 (1992) (Thomas,
J., dissenting); Rector v. Bryant, 501 U.S. 1239, 1242-43 n.2 (1991) (Marshall, J.,dissenting
from the denial of certiorari); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 666 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 718 (StevensJ, dissenting); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 500 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Watkins v. Murray, 493 U.S. 907, 908 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 304, 326 (1989); Britz.v.
Illinois, 489 U.S. 1044, 1045 (1989) (Marshall, J.,dissenting from the denial of certiorari);
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 307 (1987); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 561
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 562 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Mitchell v. Kemp,
483 U.S. 1026, 1026 (1987) (Marshall,J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Booth v.
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 520 (1987) (ScaliaJ., dissenting); Buttrum v. Black, 479 U.S. 902
(1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Darden v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 168, 186 (1986); Teague v. Tennessee, 473 U.S. 911, 912 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 475 n.14 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Maxwell v. Pennsylvania, 469 U.S. 971,
3
4

971 (1984) (Marshall,J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S.
37, 50 n.10 (1984); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875 n.13 (1983); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 607 n.14 (1978);Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279 (1976) (WhiteJ., concurring);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177 (1976) (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 387 (1972) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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and how it fits into the existing scheme of capital sentencing.9
Although talk of mercy is not completely absent from the Court's
death-penalty jurisprudence, the talk is neither prominent nor especially illuminating. Mercy is sometimes portrayed as a benevolent virtue for which the law should make room. On these occasions-often
in dissent-mercy's noble and compassionate side shines. 10 At other
times, the Court's reaction to mercy is more ambivalent, and sometimes even hostile. On these occasions the compassionate side of
9 The concept of mercy has received very little attention from criminal law scholars.
See, e.g., Andrew von Hirsch, Equality, "Anisonomy," andJustice: A Review of Madness and the
Criminal Law, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1093, 1107 (1984) (book review) ("[P]enologists... have
hardly touched upon the concept of mercy."); Nigel Walker, The Quiddity of Mercy, 70 PHIL
27, 27 (1995) ("Anatomists of criminal justice systems usually ignore the tiny organ called
'mercy' or 'clemency.'"). For rare exceptions, see Joshua Dressier, Reflections on Excusing
Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERs LJ. 671, 699
(1988) [hereinafter Dressler, Excusing Wrongdoers] (discussing the difference between justice and mercy); Eric . Muller, The Virtue of Mercy in CriminalSentencing, 24 SETON HALL L
REv. 288, 330-38 (1993) (discussing mercy in the context of noncapital sentencing); Paul
W. Cobb, Jr., Note, Reviving Mercy in the Structure of Capital Punishment, 99 YALE LJ. 389
(1989) (discussing the decline of "mercy" throughout the entire system of capital
sentencing).
Mercy has, however, received more attention from philosophers. See, e.g.; GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 807-10 (1978) ;Jeffrie Murphy, Mercy and LegalJustice,
inJEFmE G. MuiRu'Y &JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 162 (1988) [hereinafter

Murphy, Mercy and Legal.Justice];Andrew Brien, Saving Grace; CRiM. JusT. EHmICs, Winter/
Spring 1990, at 52; Cheshire Calhoun, Changing One's Heart 103 ETHICS 76, 78-81 (1992);
Joshua Dressier, Hating Criminals:How Can Something that Feels So Good Be Wrong?, 88 MICH.
L. REv. 1448, 1468-73 (1990) [hereinafter Dressler, Hating Criminals]; R.A. Duff, Justice,
Mercy andForgiveness, CRuM.JUsT. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1990, at 51;J.LA4, Garcia, Two Con-

cepts ofDesert; 5 LAw & PHIL. 219 (1986); Ross Harrison, The Equality of Mercy, inJURISPRUDENCE: CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS 107 (Hyman Gross & Ross Harrison eds., 1992); Sterling

Harwood, Is Mercy Inherently Unjust?, in CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 464 (Michael J. Gorr &
Sterling Harwood eds., 1995); H. Scott Hestevold, Justice to Mercy, 46 PHIL. & PHENOM. RES.
281 (1985); H. Scott Hestevold, Disjunctive Desert, 20 AM. PHIL. Q. 357 (1983); Carla Johnson, SeasoningJustice 99 ETHICS 553 (1989); Herbert Morris, Murphy on Forgiveness, CRIM.
Jusr. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1988, at 15;Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness, Mercy, and the Retributive Emotions, CRiM.JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1988, at 3 [hereinafter Murphy, Forgiveness,

Mercy, and the Retributive Emotions];JeffiieG. Murphy, A Rejoinder to Morris, CRIM.JUsT. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1988 at 20; Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL & PUB. Air.
83 (1993); Lyla H. O'Driscoll, The Quality of Mercy, 21 S.J. PHIL. 229 (1983); George W.
Rainbolt, Mercy: An Independent, Imperfect rtue, 27 AM. PHIL. Q. 169 (1990); N.E. Simmonds, Judgment and Mercy, 13 OxroRD J. LEOAL STrUD. 52 (1993); Steven Sverdlik, Justice
and Mercy, 16J. Soc. PHIL- 36 (1985). For earlier discussions, see Claudia Card, On Mercy,
81 PHIL. REv. 182 (1972);John Kleinig, Mercy andJustice; 44 PHIL 341 (1969); H.R.T. Roberts, Mercy, 46 PHIL. 352 (1971); Alwynne Smart, Mercy, 43 PHIL 345 (1968);James Sterba,
Can a PersonDeserve Mercy?, 10J. Soc. PHIL. 11 (1979); P. Twambley, Mercy and Forgiveness,
36 ANALYSIS 84 (1976).
10 See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 718 (1990) (Stevens,J., dissenting); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 190 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Past conduct often
provides insights into a person's character that will evoke a merciful response to a demand
for the ultimate punishment even though it may shed no light on what may happen in the
future."); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 562 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The
sentencer's ability to respond with mercy towards a defendant has always struck me as a
particularly valuable aspect of the capital sentencing procedure.").
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mercy yields to its common association with arbitrariness and capriciousness, both of which supposedly flow from the irrationality at
mercy's core."
In short, the Court has no coherent understanding of mercy or
its place in the structure of the penalty phase of a capital trial. This
Article proposes a new way to look at the penalty phase. It submits
that the penalty phase should be reconstructed to incorporate and
accommodate mercy, or at least that capital sentencing juries should
be instructed, at the defendant's request, that mercy lies within their
power to dispense.
Although mercy is the capstone of this proposal to reconfigure
the penalty phase, two critical and controversial assumptions lie at its
foundation. First, this Article assumes that retributive principles animate the basic structure of the penalty phase insofar as the object of
capital sentencing is to impose deserved punishment. This assumption may seem unwarranted because the Court now permits the penalty phase to serve nonretributive goals. 12 For example, death
sentences can be imposed to send a deterrent signal (general deterrence) or to keep the offender from offending again (specific deterrence, or incapacitation). Still, the Court insists that a death sentence
should represent a "'reasoned moral response"'" 3 to the offender and
the offense, and that it must reflect the offender's "moral guilt" or
"moral culpability," all of which seems to resonate most naturally with
the language and rhetoric of retributivism. If retribution is not the
14
only goal of the penalty phase, perhaps it is first among equals.
11

For example, according to the Court in Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993):
[W]e have not construed the Lockett line of cases to mean that ajury must
be able to dispense mercy on the basis of a sympathetic response to the
defendant. Indeed, we have said that "[uit would be very difficult to reconcile a rule allowing the fate of a defendant to turn on the vagaries of particular jurors' emotional sensitivities with our longstanding recognition that,
above all, capital sentencing must be reliable, accurate, and nonarbitrary."
Id. at 371-72 (alteration in original) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 493 (1990));
accord Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 349 (1985) (RehnquistJ., dissenting).
12 See, e.g., Harris v. Alabama, 115 S.Ct. 1031, 1035 (1995).
13 See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (quoting California v. Brown,
479 U.S. 538, 545 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
14 See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462 (1984) ("[R]etribution clearly plays
a more prominent role in a capital case [than in a noncapital one]."); Markus D. Dubber,
Regulating the Tender Heart When the Axe is Ready to Strike, 41 BUFF. L. Ruv. 85, 132 (1993)
("Over the course of capital jurisprudence since Furman, the Court has settled on a generally retributive approach to capital sentencing."); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice:
Moralizing the Passions of CriminalPunishment, 74 CoRNr. L.Ruv. 655, 661 n.13 (1989)
(noting that the "Supreme Court's eighth amendmentjurisprudence emphasizes a... retributive view of punishment"); cf.MargaretJ. Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Processfor Death, 53 S.CAi. L. RPv. 1143, 1159 (1980) ("The substantive
judgment to be made [in capital sentencing] is a moral judgment: Does this person deserve death as punishment.;"); Richard S. Murphy, Comment, The Significance of Victim
Harm: Booth v. Maryland and the Philosophy ofPunishment in the Supreme Cour, 55 U. Cm. L.
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Moreover, because the idea of mercy is intelligible only within a retributive philosophy of punishment, 15 we can investigate the role of mercy
in capital sentencing only if we are prepared to look at the process
from a retributive point of view.
Second, this Article assumes that it makes sense to claim a crimi16
nal defendant is "deserving" or "undeserving" of the death penalty,
and that retributivism does not rule out capital punishment as a legitimate criminal sanction. 17 In other words, it assumes that some ofREv. 1303, 1333 (1988) ("[T]he Court's approach to punishment, at least in the death

penalty context, is essentially retributive despite protestations to the contrary.").
15 See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
16 For expressions of the view that we cannot know what punishment a defendant
deserves, or that we have no "workable way" to determine what punishment is deserved,
see, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 450 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The sentencer's function is not to discover a fact, but to mete outjust deserts as he
sees them. Absent a mandatory sentence, there is no objective measure by which the sentencer's decision can be deemed correct or erroneous .... ."); Hugo A. Bedau, Retributivism
and the Theory of Punishmen 75J. PHIL. 601, 611-15 (1978); Vivian Berger, "Black Box Decisions" on Lifre
orDeath-IfThey're Arbitrary, Don't Blame theJury:A Reply to judge PatrickHigginbotham, 41 CASE W. REs. L. Ruv. 1067, 1081 n.81 (1991) (suggesting it is dubious to assume
a death sentence either can or cannot be "erroneous"); David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of
Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1623, 1636-41 (1992) (arguing that retributivism does not
explain what punishment a particular crime deserves); Robert Weisberg, DeregulatingDeath,
1983 Sup. CT. RE%,.305, 353 ("[T]he penalty trial is an existential moment of moral perception, neither right nor wrong, and therefore largely u nreviewable."); J.L. Mackie, Morality
and the Retributive Emotions, CrM. JuST. ETmics, Winter/Spring 1992, at 3, 7-8. But cf.
Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in REsPONSIBILITY, CHARAcrER, AND THE
EMOTIONS 179, 186-87 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (suggesting that this epistemological objection is made against retributive judgments, but not against other judgments relying on moral desert).
17 For the view that retributivism is, for one reason or another, incompatible with the
death penalty, see, e.g., Mary E. Gale, Retribution,Punishment and Death, 18 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 973 1028-33 (1985); Robert S. Gerstein, CapitalPunishment-"Crueland Unusual": A
Retributivist Response 85 ETHics 75, 78-79 (1974); cf. Richard 0. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for CapitalPunishment 79 MIcH. L. REV.
1177, 1184 (1981) ("Basic principles of moral justice that are believed to justify... [the
death penalty] are necessarily offended by the attempt to impose a system of state executions in an imperfect world."); Robert A. Pugsley, A RetributivistArgument Against Capital
Punishmen 9 HoFsTRA L REV. 1501, 1516-23 (1981) (explaining that retributivism may be
incompatible with the death penalty because of the difficulty of reconciling respect for an
individual's dignity with executions); MargaretJ. Radin, The Jurisprudenceof Death:Evolving
Standardsfor the Cruel and UnusualPunishment Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989, 1053 (1978)
(discussing Justice Marshall's view "that punishments imposed to serve the purposes of
retribtion are constitutionally prohibited"); Jeffrey H. Reiman, Justice, Civilization, and the
DeathPenalty:Answering van den Haag, 14 PHIL- & PuB. Arr. 115, 132 (1985) ("[W]e have no
right to exact the full cost of murders from our murderers until we have done everything
possible to rectify the conditions that produce their crimes."); George Schedler, Can RetributivistsSupport Legal Punishment?,63 MONIST 51, 62 (1980) (concluding that a consistent
retributivist condemns all legal punishment). For retributive defenses of the death penalty, see, e.g., Igor Primorac, On CapitalPunishmen 17 ISR. L. REv. 133, 138 (1982) (defending position that death is the only proportionate punishment for murder); cf.WALTER
BERNS, FOR CArrAL PUNISHMENT 172-73 (1979) ("Capital punishment... serves to remind
us of the majesty of the moral order that is embodied in our law .... ."); Ernest van den
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fenders commit crimes for which the just punishment is death.
Abolitionists and critics of retributivism, in contrast, find the retributive notion that some criminal offenders "deserve" death not only mysterious,18 but morally dangerous. 19 Better, they think, to banish it
from our discourse and thinking about the morality of crime and punishment altogether. They may be right.2 0 The assumption that some
criminal offenders deserve death as punishment begs a host of critical
questions, none of which can be satisfactorily addressed here. Without this assumption, however, it becomes difficult, if not impossible,
to understand the role of mercy in capital sentencing.
The discussion proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly reviews the
constitutional history of the penalty phase. This is the history of a
supposed paradox between the goals of consistency and individualization in capital sentencing. This paradox has caused some observers to
conclude that the current structure of capital sentencing should
either be dramatically reformed or done away with altogether. When
the penalty phase is considered from a retributive perspective, however, the paradox becomes less beguiling. Moreover, our preoccupation with the paradox has diverted attention from other important
dimensions of capital sentencing, one of which is the distinction between deserved punishment and mercy. Part II develops this distinction and demonstrates how the penalty phase can be restructured to
incorporate mercy. Part III defends this new, mercy-inclusive approach to the penalty phase. It argues that failing to heed the distinction between desert and mercy needlessly increases the risk of wrongly
condemning an undeserving defendant to death. From a retributive
point of view, this is a cardinal sin. Various objections to this understanding of the penalty phase are then entertained.

Haag, The Ultimate Punishment:A Defense, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1662, 1669 (1986) (concluding

that execution is the "only fitting retribution" for murder).
18 See, e.g., David Dolinko, Some Thoughts About Retributivism, 101 ETHics 537, 538-39
(1991) (suggesting that retributivists rely "heavily on metaphor and imagery").

19

Cf id. at 559 (suggesting that retributivism as a philosophy of punishment has "bol-

ster[ed] capital punishment and... encourag[ed] an increasing reliance on imprison-

ment"). But cf. Moore, supranote 16, at 209 (suggesting that the ability of a moral view to
be used in ways which that view itself does not countenance or endorse "constitute[s] no
argument against the truth" of that view).
20 This Article takes no position on the moral defensibility or indefensibility of the
death penalty. Its goal is simply to try to better understand the place of mercy within the
existing framework of capital sentencing. The assumptions it makes are in the service of
this goal.
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I
THE "PARADOX" OF CAPITAL SENTENCING

A capital defendant is tried twice. His first trial determines
whether he is guilty of capital murder.2 ' His second determines
whether he will be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. This latter trial, the so-called "penalty phase," is perhaps the single most distinguishing feature of the Court's modern capital punishment
jurisprudence. 2 2 Yet, according to conventional wisdom, the Court
has woven an irreconcilable paradox into the very fabric of the penalty
23
phase.
A. The Paradox Created
Two principles-individualization and consistency-govern
much of the structure of the penalty phase. Rooted in the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against the infliction of "cruel and unusual
21 Because the vast majority, some 98%, of death-row inmates are male, see Death Row,
U.S.A. (NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Summer 1995,
at 1, this Article generally uses masculine pronouns when referring to capital defendants.
22 "Modem" is meant to refer to the Court's jurisprudence since Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). For an excellent account of the forces behind the
creation of this modem jurisprudence, see MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE
SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1973); see also HERBERT H.

HAINES, AGAINST

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:. THE ANTI-DEATH PENALTY MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1972-1994 (1996)

(giving an historical account of the roots of modem death-penalty jurisprudence); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 26-49

(1986) (same). For an exceptionally nuanced and balanced examination of numerous

aspects of this modem jurisprudence, see WELSH S. WHITE, THE

DEATH PENALTY IN THE

NINETIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1991); WELSH
S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM
OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1987); WELSH S. WHITE, LIFE IN THE BALANCE: PROCEDURAL SAFE-

(1984).
28 See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("To
acknowledge that there perhaps is an inherent tension between [Woodson-Lockett] and the
line [of cases] stemming from Furmanis rather like saying that there was perhaps an inherent tension between the Allies and the Axis Powers in World War H.") (internal quotations
omitted) (citations omitted); Berger, supra note 16, at 1080 ("[T]he Court's dual sentencing objectives strongly resemble Siamese twins-locked at the hip but straining uncomfortably in opposite directions.") (citations omitted); Joan W. Howarth, Deciding to KilL
Revealing the Gender in the Task Handed to CapitalJurors, 1994 Wis. L. RE-v. 1345, 1347
(describing tension as reflecting "ongoing struggle of... male against female"); Radin,
supra note 14, at 1150 ("The achievable or imaginalble level of individualization varies inversely with the achievable or imaginable level of consistency.") (emphasis omitted); Carol
S. Steiker &Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of CapitalPunishmen 109 HARV. L. REV.355, 382 (1995) ("This tension
between Greggs seeming insistence on channeling and Woodson's insistence on uncircumscribed consideration of mitigating evidence constitutes the central dilemma in postFurman capital punishment law."); Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox:Reconciling Guided
Discretionand UnguidedMitigation in CapitalSentencing 38 UCLA L. REa. 1147, 1148 (1991)
(noting the tension between guided discretion and individual consideration under the
Eighth Amendment).
GUARDS IN CAPITAL CASES
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punishments," 2 4 these principles can be traced to the landmark decisions of Furman v. Georgia2 5 and Woodson v. North Carolina.26 Individualization and consistency form the twin stars around which the Court's
modem death penalty jurisprudence orbits. They are also the source
27
of the paradox of capital sentencing.
Furmanstands for the principle of consistency. It represents the
Court's initial effort to contain the penalty of death within the rule of
law. Before Furman, most states left the death-selection decision
wholly to the jury's good judgment.28 Capital jurors exercised complete and "unfettered" discretion without any guidance from legal
rules. 2 9 Such a "lawless" system naturally made it difficult to reliably
predict who would and who would not be condemned.30 In Justice
Stewart's now-famous phrase, the death penalty "struck like light24 For historical accounts of the "original meaning" of the Eighth Amendment, compare Anthony F. Granucci, "NorCruel and UnusualPunishmentsInflicted:" The OriginalMeaning, 57 CAL. L. RFv. 839 (1969) (tracing historical origins of Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments) with RAOUL BERGER, D.ATH PENALrTeS
29-58 (1982) (disputing Granucci's account).
25
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
26
428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
27 Precisely how these principles derive from the Eighth Amendment's textual prohibition against the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments" is a matter of dispute.
According to the Court, the individualization principle rests in part on respect for the
humanity of the defendant. See, e.g., Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 ("[T] he fundamental respect
for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the character
and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense
. .."). It is also said to be based on our "'evolving standards of decency.'" Id. at 301
(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)); see also Louis D. Bilionis, MoralAppropriateness, Capital Punishment, and the Lockett Doctrine, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283
(1991). But see Walton, 497 U.S. at 670-71 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the individualization principle lacks any grounding in the Constitution's text). The consistency principle can be traced to Furman, 408 U.S. 238, and, at least according to Justice Scalia, is
grounded in the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "unusual" punishments. See
Walton, 497 U.S. at 670-71 (Scalia, J., concurring). But see Scott W. Howe, Resolving the
Conflict in the CapitalSentencing Cases: A Desert-Oriented Theory of Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV.
323, 385 (1992) (suggesting that the consistency principle does not "correspond to any
Eighth Amendment principle").
According to one thoughtful observer, both the individualization and consistency
principles ultimately derive from the fundamental right to equal concern and respect as a
person. Under this theory, the consistency principle is intermediately grounded in the
idea of equal treatment and the individualization principle is intermediately grounded in
the idea of deserved treatment. See Radin, supranote 14, at 1150; cf.JoL FEINBERG, SOCIA.
PmLosoPm' 98-99 (1973) (distinguishing between absolute justice (deserved treatment)
and comparative justice (equal treatment)).
28
See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971) (upholding a discretionary capital sentencing scheme under Due Process Clause).
29
See, e.g., Woodson, 428 U.S. at 291-92; Daniel Givelber, The New Law of Murder, 69
INn. L.J. 375, 387 (1994).
SO See Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules 222 (1991) ("Discretionjust is freedom
from otherwise plausible fetters. As constraint is imposed then discretion diminishes pro
tanto.").
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ning."3' This state of affairs was intolerable. Any legal sanction-let
alone death-applied with no more regularity than a bolt out of the
blue was an insult to the rule of law and the virtues associated with
that ideal. The rule of law requires some appreciable sense of consistency, predictability, and even-handedness when the state applies its
coercive power, especially its ultimate power.
In Furman, the Court issued a short per curiam order holding that
"the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases
constitute cruel and unusual punishment."32 Because the Court's
cryptic order was followed by nine separate opinions, no one knew
precisely what Furman required. In time, however, the Court came to
read Furman as condemning the death penalty's arbitrary and capricious application.3 3 Furman'snoble aspiration was to bring the deathselection process within the limits of the rule of law and to make that
4
process "rational."3
In response to Furman,state lawmakers imposed rules on the sentencing process designed to regulate the jury's discretion over who
could and who could not be sentenced to death. Different states
adopted different rules,35 but each state's response was based on the
31
See Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("These death sentences are
cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.").
32 See id. at 239-40.
33
See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("Furman
mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the
determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be
suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action."); accord California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1000 (1983) (noting that vague aggravating factors can lead to "arbitrary and capricious sentencing patterns condemned in
Furman").
34 Problems of arbitrariness and discrimination exist throughout the capital sentencing system-notjust at the penalty phase. These problems exist, for example, in the prosecutor's decision to charge. See, e.g., Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Reimposition of Capital
Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 27, 327
(1988) (reporting "clear and significant discrepancies in the treatment of potentially capital cases when cases were differentiated by race of defendant and victim and county of
jurisdiction"); Developments in the Law: Race and the CriminalProcess, 101 HARv.L. Ruv. 1472,
1520-57 (1988) (analyzing race and the prosecutor's charging decision); Jonathan R. Sorensen &James W. Marquart, ProsecutorialandJury Decision-Makingin Post-FurmanTexas Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 743, 775 (1990-91) (concluding that
"prosecutorial decisions were based partially on legal factors and partially on the race of
the victim"). However, the state enjoys a presumption that its prosecutions are brought in
good faith. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). But cf.DeGarmo v.
Texas, 474 U.S. 973, 975 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari)
(urging that "where death is the consequence, the prosecutor's [charging decision] must
be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.") (quotations omitted).
35 See, e.g., Gregg 428 U.S. at 179 (plurality opinion) (noting that thirty-five states reenacted capital statutes after Furman); ZIMRING & HAWUNS, supranote 22, at 41-45 (describing "social psychology of backlash"); Daniel D. Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment?
Furman v. Georgia, 1972 Sup. CT. Ray. 1 (questioning whether Furmanreally provides the
states with any guidance); John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, CapitalPunishment and the
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same underlying conviction that the addition of rules would satisfy
Furman's demands. Some states concluded that the most efficient way
to achieve consistency in capital sentencing was to condemn to death
every defendant found guilty of a capital crime.36 Under these socalled mandatory statutes defendants guilty of aggravated murder
were condemned to death by operation of law. Mandatory statutes
left the jury no discretion. Assuming the jury could easily apply the
rules defining the condemned class, the death penalty would be imposed fairly and consistently, and Furman's aspiration would be
satisfied.
Yet mandatory statutes came with a hefty moral price tag.
Although they promised to produce an impressive degree of consistency, they ignored morally relevant detail about the particular characteristics of the offender and the particular circumstances of his
Substantive CriminalLaw: The Rise and Fall of Mandaty CapitalPunishment,28 Auz. L. REv.
143, 238-41 (1986) (listing state enactments made in response to Furman).
Three basic capital sentencing models emerged in response to Furman. (1) The Florida "weighing" model listed both aggravating and mitigating circumstances and required
the sentencer to weigh them against each other in order to determine the sentence.
Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion). (2) The Georgia "threshold"
model listed aggravating and mitigating circumstances but gave the jury no real guidance
once it had found the existence of one statutory aggravating circumstance. Gregg, 428 U.S.
at 153 (plurality opinion). (3) The Texas "definition" model narrowly defined the crime
of capital murder-in essence building the aggravating circumstances into the definition
of the offense-and then presented the jury with three special questions. An affirmative
answer to each question required the jury to impose a death sentence. Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion). States have developed various permutations and combinations of these basic models including: vesting sentencing authority in ajudge or panel
ofjudges; splitting sentencing authority between judge andjury; allowing judicial overrides
ofjury sentences; listing "special circumstances" without enumerating them as either "aggravating" or "mitigating;" and requiring comparative proportionality review. For an analysis of early post-Furman capital sentencing schemes, see Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies,
129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 102-19 (1980).

This Article focuses on jury sentencing. It ignores special problems presented by
judge sentencing or some combination ofjudge and jury sentencing. See, e.g., Sochor v.
Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 539-41 (1992) (describing Florida system of shared sentencing responsibility). For criticisms of divided-authority systems like Florida's, see, Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1039 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.
447, 475 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Michael Mello, The
Jurisdictionto Do Justice:Florida'sJury Override and the State Constitution, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
923 (1991); Michael Mello & Ruthann Robson, Judge OverJury: Florida'sPracticeof Imposing
Death Over Life in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 31 (1985); Katheryn K Russell, The
ConstitutionalityofJury Override in Alabama Death Penalty Cases, 46 AI.A. L. REv. 5 (1994).
36
See, e.g., Woodson, 428 U.S. at 286; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 327 (1976); see also
Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 67 (1987); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 634 (1977)
(per curiam); ef. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 487 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(stating that "mandatory penalty scheme[s] [were] a perfectly reasonable legislative response to the concerns expressed in Furman"). In the years preceding Furman, many states
had rejected mandatory schemes, partly because juries would sometimes acquit guilty defendants in order to avoid imposing a death sentence. See, e.g., Woodson, 428 U.S. at 290-91.
See generally Poulos, supra note 35, at 146-54 (discussing the history of mandatory capital
statutes).
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offense. Indeed, mandatory statutes could achieve a high degree of
consistency precisely because they ignored such detail. Mandatory
statutes, in the Court's words, treated "all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind
37
infliction of the penalty of death."
Because mandatory statutes exacted such a heavy moral price and
achieved only an artificial brand of consistency,38 the Court struck
39
them down four years after Furman in Woodson v. North Carolina.
Woodson stands for the second principle governing the modem penalty phase: A capital defendant must be treated as an individual. 40 Rejecting cruder forms of lex talionis,4 1 the Woodson Court explained that
our "evolving standards of decency," 42 as well as the ideal of human
dignity underlying the Eighth Amendment, 43 require individualizaWoodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) ("[A] consistency produced by ignoring individual differences is a false consistency."); cf.Stephen Gillers, The
Quality of Mercy: ConstitutionalAccuracy at the Selection Stage of Capital Sentendng 18 U.C.
DAVIS L REv. 1037, 1052-61 (1985) (arguing that mandatory statutes are unconstitutional
because legislatures are "incompetent7 capital sentencers); Yoram Shachar, Sentencing as
Art, 25 ISR. L. Rev. 638, 659 (1991) ("If inequality is artificially suppressed by uniform rules
created on the basis of individual intuitive choice, or caprice, the only result will be to
conceal the confusion from the public.").
39
428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
40 See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978); see alsoParker v. Dugger, 498
U.S. 308, 315 (1991); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989); Hitchcock v. Dugger,
481 U.S. 393, 394 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986); Eddings, 455 U.S.
at 114; Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 642 (1978).
41 Lex talionis requires that the harm a wrongdoer intentionally causes be reflected
back upon him in punishment, with little or no attention paid to anything other than the
harm. On Lex talionis generally, compare HuGo A. BEDAU, DEATH Is DIFFERENT 41 (1987)
("[I]f we attempt to give exact and literal implementation to lex talionis,society as a whole
will find itself descending to the cruelties and savagery that criminals employ.") with Jeremy Waldron, Lex Talionis, 34 AIz. L. REa. 25 (1992) (developing and defending a modified version of lex talionis).
42 See, e.g., Woodson, 428 U.S. at 301 (citation omitted); see also Bilionis, supranote 27,
at 293-94 (discussing society's evolving standards of decency and the Eighth Amendment).
43 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 ("[T]he fundamental respect for humanity underlying the
Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the character and record of the individual
offender.... .") (citation omitted); ef Hugo A. Bedau, The EighthAmendment, Human Dignity, and theDeathPenalty, inTHE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS 145 (MichaelJ. Meyer & William
A. Parent eds., 1992) (arguing that human dignity underlies our vision of the Eighth
Amendment). The Woodson Court also noted that mandatory statutes "papered over the
problem of unguided and uncheckedjury discretion." See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302; see also
Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 485-87 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring). Whatever its
constitutional grounding, individualization is commonly taken to be a requirement ofjustice. See SCHAUER, supra note 30, at 137 ("Frequently the goals ofjustice are served not by
the rule-followers, but by those whose abilities at particularized decision-making transcend
the inherent limitations of rules."); Murphy, Mercy and LegalJustie, supra note 9, at 171
("This demand for individuation-a tailoring of our retributive response to the individual
natures of the persons with whom we are dealing-is part of what we mean by taking
persons seriously as persons and is thus a basic demand ofjustice."); cf.Eddings,455 U.S. at
37

38
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don in capital sentencing. In Lockett v. Ohio,44 the Court translated
this principle into a constitutional rule entitling a capital defendant to
present any evidence he wished in mitigation of his sentence. In a
capital case, the Lockett Court said, the "sentencer [cannot] ... be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of the
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death."4 5
Although the Court sometimes suggests that the individualization
principle points only toward mitigation, the principle actually supports both mitigation and aggravation. It allows the decisionmaker
access to all the relevant facts and circumstances, mitigating and aggravating alike, needed to determine what sentence is appropriate.
The Court's decision in Zant v. Stephens,46 taken together with Lockett,
reflects this understanding. As already noted, Lockett entitles a capital
defendant to present any mitigating evidence he wishes, whether or
not it falls within the scope of a specific statutory mitigating circumstance. Conversely, once the state has proven the existence of at least
one statutory aggravating circumstance, Stephens permits the state to
introduce whatever aggravating evidence it sees fit, provided that evidence relates to the character of the offender or the circumstances of
the offense. 4 7
112 ("'Uustice. . .requires ...tak[ing] into account the circumstances of the offense
together with the character and propensities of the offender.'") (quoting Pennsylvania v.
Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937) (citations omitted)).
44 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
45
Id. at 604; see also Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at 394 ("[I]n capital cases, the sentencer may
not refuse to consider or be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence.") (internal quotations omitted); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 ("The need for treating
each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the
individual is far more important than in noncapital cases."). See generally Bilionis, supra
note 27, at 300-13 (explaining structure of the Lockett rule).
46 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
47 See id. at 876-79; id. at 900 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("[O]nce a single aggravating circumstance is specified, the jury then considers all the evidence in aggravation-mitigation in deciding whether to impose the death penalty.") (emphasis added); see also
Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S.Ct 2630, 2639 (1994) ("[T~he sentencer may be given 'unbridied discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed after it has
found that the defendant is a member of the class made eligible for that penalty.'") (quoting Stephens, 462 U.S. at 875); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988); Barclay v.
Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 954 (1983); Berger, supranote 16, at 1076; Howe, supra note 27, at
384 n.241 ("Stephens essentially granted the states a right to admit Lockett evidence .... ")
(citing Robert Weisberg, DeregulatingDeath, 1983 Sup. CT. RP~v. 305, 358); Bruce S.
Ledewitz, The New Role of Statutory Aggravating Circumstances in American Death Penalty Law,
22 DuQ. L. REv. 317, 350-51 (1984) ("The opinion in Zant v. Stephens permits consideration
of non-statutory aggravating circumstance [sic] as a basis for the decision to impose the
death penalty, but only when one statutory aggravating circumstance is found to be
present.").
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Commentators have often remarked that Furman's mandate of
consistency and Woodson's mandate of individualization compete with
one another at some level. Complete realization of one can come
only at the expense of the other. The more individualized the deathselection process becomes the more difficult it is for that process to
generate consistent outcomes. By the same token, any increase in
consistency is possible only at the price of ignoring individual considerations. The two are inversely related. 48 They are, as the Court itself
has acknowledged, in "tension," or "somewhat contradictory."49 Yet,
according to the Court, the Constitution requires the penalty phase to
incorporate both.
Shortly before his retirement from the Court, Justice Blackmun
concluded in dissent that this tension could not be resolved. Moreover, because he thought this irresolvable tension rendered the death
penalty unconstitutional, he vowed no longer to "tinker with the machinery of death."50 Justice Scalia reasoned otherwise. According to
Justice Scalia, the tension disappears if we eliminate one of the principles giving rise to it. He elected to eliminate the individualization
principle, which he thought the Eighth Amendment simply did not
require. 5 1 IfJustice Scalia's vision were to prevail, mandatory statutes
48 See Berger, supra note 16, at 1080 ("[T]he Court's dual sentencing objectives
strongly resemble Siamese twins-locked at the hip but straining uncomfortably in opposite directions."); Radin, supra note 14, at 1150 ("The achievable or imaginable level of
individualization varies inversely with the achievable or imaginable level of consistency.")
(emphasis omitted); Sundby, supra note 23, at 1161.
49
See, e.g., Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2635; Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. 2004, 2009
(1994); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 479 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring); Walton v.
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664-65 (1990) (ScaliaJ., concurring); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S.
164, 182 (1988) (plurality opinion); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 363 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 544 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
50 See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun,J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari); see also Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 357-58 (1992) (Blackmun,J.,
concurring).
51 Justice Scalia reasoned that the individualization principle has less basis in the
Eighth Amendment's text than does the consistency principle. See Walton, 497 U.S. at 671
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("The Woodson-Lockett line of cases ... bears no relation whatever to
the text of the Eighth Amendment."). In contrast, because a punishment whose application is unpredictable can plausibly be characterized as "unusual," Justice Scalia reasoned
that the consistency principle has a stronger claim to constitutional status. Outside the
death penalty context, however, Justice Scalia has taken a narrower view of unusualness.
He has argued, for example, that a punishment cannot be considered constitutionally "unusual" as long as it is a punishment that has been traditionally used, or that was in use at
the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 976
(1991) (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J., announcing the decision of the Court). Justice
Thomas is sympathetic to justice Scalia's position. See Graham, 506 U.S. at 498-99 (Thomas,
J., concurring).
In a cryptic footnote to his Walton concurrence, Justice Scalia stated in response to a
dissent by justice Stevens: "Ifand when the Court redefines Furmanto permit [sentencers
to have complete discretion without a requisite finding of aggravating factors], and to re-
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would once again be constitutional, and the states would be free to
treat capital defendants as part of a "faceless, undifferentiated mass to
52
be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death."
B.

Individualization, Consistency, and Moral Error

When Justice Blackmun and Justice Scalia confront the paradox
of capital sentencing, they see no way out short of abolishing the
death penalty or eliminating one of the two core principles of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. We can, however, come to terms with the
paradox without embracing either of these alternatives. Indeed, once
we assume that the primary purpose of the penalty phase is to impose
deserved punishment, while reducing the risk of the undeserving being wrongly condemned, the two principles actually complement one
another.
When all is said and done, the principles of consistency and individualization are "formal" principles of decisionmaking. 53 Consistency in decisionmaking-treating like cases alike 5 4 -is associated
quire an assessment (I cannot imagine on what basis) that a sufficiently narrow level of the

'pyramid' of murder has been reached, I shall be prepared to reconsider my evaluation of
Woodson and Lockett" Walton, 497 U.S. at 665 n.*. If by this Justice Scalia means that he is
willing to uphold Lockett if the single-aggravator rule, see infranote 78, is rejected, but not
otherwise, his position is untenable. The single-aggravator rule is so weak that little difference exists between the system now in place (in which complete discretion exists with
respect to aggravating and mitigating evidence once a single aggravator is found) and the
one Justice Scalia seems to imagine (in which complete discretion exists with respect to
aggravating and mitigating evidence, but in which no aggravator need be found). Because
the two systems are virtually the same, it makes little sense to reject the former, but accept
the latter.
52 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion). AcceptingJustice Scalia's argument and rejecting Lockett would make mandatory statutes constitutionally permissible but probably not constitutionally required. See, e.g., Sundby, supra
note 23, at 1186-90 (describing implications ofJustice Scalia's call to overrule Lockett).
58 On the distinction between rule-based and standard-based decisionmaking, see
generally P.S. AT'AH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FoRM AND SuBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW

70-75 (1987) (describing the nature and role of rules); SCHAUER, supra note 30, at 77-78
(distinguishing between particularistic and rule-bound decisionmaking); Ronald J. Allen,
Foreword-Evidence,Inference, Rules, andJudgmnentin ConstitutionalAdjudication:The Intriguing
Case of Walton v. Arizona, 81 J. CiuM. L. & CRIMnOLOGY 727, 735 (1991) (noting the distinction between "individuated decisionmaking" and "categorical reasoning"). There is a
vast literature on the relative virtues and vices of decisionmaking according to rules and
standards. See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 30, at 135-45; Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE LJ. 557 (1992); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 1175, 1179 (1989); Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14
HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 645, 650-51 (1991); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards,83 UCLA L.
REv. 379 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: TheJustices
of Rules and Standards, 106 HAiv. L. REv. 22, 62-67 (1992).
54 Consistency in decisionmaking is also associated with "equality of treatment" or
"formal justice." Indeed, the ideas of consistency and equal treatment only make sense by
reference to some rule or description under which two cases can intelligibly be described
as equal. See PETER WESTEN, SPFAKNo OF EQUALrIY 197-99 (1990); see alsoJohn E. Coons,
Conistency, 75 CAL.L. REv. 59, 70 (1987) ("[I]nconsistency under a rule is any difference
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with decisionmaking based on rules. How much consistency a decisionmaking process achieves depends on the nature and content of
the rule being applied. For example, a relatively precise rule will
achieve a greater degree of consistency across a range of cases than
will a more general rule. Any rule, however, will be over-inclusive and
under-inclusive with respect to its underlying justification. 55 Such is
the nature of rules.
In contrast, individualization in decisionmaking is not rulebound. It seeks the "right" result in each case and thus takes into
account any factor relevant to the decision at hand. Individualized
decisionmaking is guided by and based upon the justification underlying the decision. That justification in turn identifies what considerations the decisionmaker should take into account. Rather than
forcing the decisionmaker to rely on a rule derived from the underlyingjustification-a rule which will invariably be over- and under-inclusive-individualized decisionmaking allows the decisionmaker to base
its decision on a direct application of the justification itself.
In a capital sentencing system premised on retributivism, death
sentences should be imposed only if they are deserved. The individualization principle within a system of this sort allows the jury to gain
access to all the facts and circumstances it needs to identify the defendant's just deserts.5 6 These facts and circumstances are necessarily
vast and varied, reflecting the rich texture of the moral world. No
rule could fully capture all of the appropriate considerations. The
pattern of death sentences resulting from such individualized decisionmaking will, however, be difficult to explain. 5 7 Human limitations
and the different moral outlooks jurors bring to their task guarantee
that this will be so.
At the same time, the point of the consistency principle in capital
sentencing is to prescind from the particulars of the moral world, ignoring some and attending to others, in order to achieve an appreciable measure of consistency across cases. The consistency principle
among treatments that arise from ends left to the will of the individual decision-maker.");
Cf. WOJCIECH SADUP.SKI, GIVING DESERT ITS DUE: SOCIALJUSTICE AND LEGAL THEORY 78-83

(1985) (distinguishing between equality before law and equality in law).
55 SCHAUER, supra note 80, at 32.
56 Capital sentencing juries are said to represent the "conscience of the community."
However, they "represent" the community only because they are members of the community, not because they discern and then apply community standards. See Stanton D. Krauss,
Representing the Community: A Look at the Selection Process in Obscenity and CapitalSentencing,
64 IND. L.J. 617, 617-18 (1989).
57 This does not mean, however, that capital sentencing within a purely individualized
system would necessarily be "arbitrary" in the sense of being based on no standard. Cf
Michael Davis, Sentencing: MustJusticeBeEven-Handed?,1 LAw & PHIL. 77, 80 (1982) (distinguishing between "arbitrary" as in based on no standard and "arbitrary" as in based on no
.usable" standard).
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reduces the need for individualized judgment. It shifts decisionmaking power away from the sentencer and toward the rule formulated to
guide the sentencer's decision. Yet whatever marginal gains in consistency we make when we transform an individualized decisionmaking
process into a rule-bound one, those gains come only at the price of
ignoring relevant moral detail. Inherent in this trade-off is the paradox of the penalty phase.
At first blush, the principles of individualization and consistency
do indeed appear to be at odds with one another. When placed
within a retributive model of the penalty phase, however, the two principles look less antagonistic and, in fact, work in tandem toward the
ultimate goal of imposing just punishment. They simply serve that
goal in different ways. More importantly, the way the two principles
interact to structure decisionmaking within the penalty phase reduces
the risk of condemning a defendant who does not deserve death.
In order to see how this happens, imagine the way the penalty
phase would work if it were built on one principle to the exclusion of
the other. A capital sentencing system dedicated solely to consistency
would require a sentencing rule that left no room for meaningful disagreement about whether the rule applies. Under such a system, a
legal rule would identify a particular class of offenders and would require the jury to impose death on every member in the class. As with
any rule, the rule defining the condemned class would inevitably be
both over- and under-inclusive with respect to its underlying justification. 5s If that justification is, as we have supposed, that death should

be imposed only on those defendants who deserve it, any rule built on
this justification would unavoidably impose death on some offenders
who did not deserve it (i.e., a rule will be over-inclusive and will yield
false-positives). It would also unavoidably spare some offenders who
did not deserve to be spared (i.e., a rule will be under-inclusive and
will yield false-negatives).
In other words, over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness, both
of which inevitably arise in any rule-bound decisionmaking process,
produce two forms of injustice and two forms of inequality. When a
rule is under-inclusive and produces a false-negative, the injustice that
results is imposing a punishment (life imprisonment) less than that
which the defendant deserves (death). The resulting inequality is an
instance of likes being treated unalike, because the defendant deserves death but gets life, while others who deserve death get death.
When a rule is over-inclusive and produces a false-positive, the injustice that results is imposing a punishment (death) greater than that

58

SCHAUER, supra note 30, at 32.

1996]

MERCY IN CAPTIAL SENTENCING

1005

which the defendant deserves (life imprisonment) 9 The resulting
inequality is an instance of unalikes being treated alike, because while
others who get death deserve death, the defendant gets death but deserves life.
A system dedicated to individualization would suffer from neither
over-inclusiveness nor under-inclusiveness. The jury in such a system
would simply be instructed to impose death on those and only those
offenders who deserve it. However, an individualized system would
still produce false-positives and false-negatives. 60 Here, the problem is
that jurors are human and make mistakes. They will mistakenly impose death on some offenders who do not deserve death, and mistakenly spare some who do. Under a completely individualized
sentencing regime moral error would thus arise not from a feature of
decisionmaking according to rules but from a failure of human judgment and moral insight.6 1 Omniscient jurors would never err. They
2
would always impose death on only those defendants deserving of it.6
Real jurors, however, are not omniscient.
The penalty phase is a human institution, and human institutions
produce injustice. Whether modeled wholly on the principle of individualization or wholly on the principle of consistency, the penalty
phase will sometimes fail: Undeserving defendants will be condemned
(false-positives) and deserving defendants will be spared (false-negatives). This inevitability of error, especially false-positive error, leads
some to call for abolition. For them, no risk of error is morally tolerable. For those who are prepared to tolerate the inevitable risk of error, the most morally pressing of the two forms of injustice is that of
executing defendants who do not deserve death. If some form of
moral triage is unavoidable, the law's first priority should be to reduce

59
Cf. Scott W. Howe, Reassessing the Individualization Mandate in Capital Sentencing.
Darrow'sDefense of Leopold and Loeb, 79 IowA L. REv. 989, 1051-56 (1994) (describing this
form of error as "retributive excess").
60 Roscoe Pound observed this long ago. See Roscoe Pound, Introduction, to RAYMOND

SAIEirTS, THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PUNISHMENT Xi, xvii (Rachel SzoldJastrow trans., 2d

ed. 1911) ("Obviously the crude individualization achieved by our juries, and especially by
leaving the assessment of penalties to trial juries, involves quite as much inequality and
injustice as the mechanical application of the law by a magistrate.").
61 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Practical Reasons and Norms 60 (reprint 1990) (noting that
"human fallibility is a major reason for having.., rules").
62 MargaretJ. Radin, Risk-of-Error Rules and Non-IdealJustification, in NoMos XXVIII:
JUSTIFICATON 33, 42 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1986) ("The ideal
observer does not make mistakes."); MargaretJ. Radin, Proportionality,Subjectivity, and Tragedy, 18 U.G. DAVIS L. Rrv. 1165, 1168 (1985) (noting that in "an ideal system ... the
supposed paradox of fit 'versus' equal treatment would never arise") [hereinafter Radin,
PMportionality].
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the incidence of false-positives, since this-condemning the undeserv63
ing-is the greater moral wrong.

In fact, the penalty phase responds to this priority. As explained
above, any unitary system of capital sentencing, whether individualized or rule-based, will generate two forms of moral error, with falsepositive error being the greatest concern. The penalty phase is not
unitary, however. It divides the capital sentencing process into two
distinct stages-one known as the "death-eligibility stage" and the
other as the "death-selection stage." Moreover, each stage reflects one
of the two principles governing the penalty phase.64 At the first stage,
which is governed by the consistency principle, the jury's job is to apply the rules defining the so-called "death-eligible" class. If the rules
apply and the defendant falls within the class, he is death-eligible and
may be sentenced to death. If the rules do not apply and the defendant falls outside the class, he is death-ineligible. At the second stage,
which is governed by the individualization principle, the jury's task is
no longer to apply a set of rules, but rather to exercise moral judgment and decide if the particular defendant before it deserves
65
death.
63 See, e.g., Randy Hertz & Robert Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death- Lockett v. Ohio and the CapitalDefendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69
CAL. L. REv. 317, 376 (1981) ("An erroneous decision to extinguish the defendant's life is
far more opprobrious than an erroneous decision to spare the defendant and sentence
him to life imprisonment."); cf. Radin, Proportionality,supra note 62, at 1169 (arguing that
"norm of respect for persons requires that the risk of error [in capital sentencing] be
borne by the punisher and not the punished"). This view has its challengers. A hard
retributivist, for example, would rate the injustice of a false-negative on a par with the
injustice of a false-positive. See, e.g., Ernest van den Haag, supra note 17 (arguing that it is
as morally wrong to spare a defendant who deserves death as it is to condemn a defendant
who does not deserve it); Ernest van den Haag, Refuting Reiman and Nathanson, 14 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 165, 174 (1985) (same); cf.Allen, supra note 53, at 737 ("[R]educing the size of
the death eligible class will almost surely reduce the number of arbitrary death sentences
imposed, but it will just as surely increase the number of arbitrary life sentences imposed
(again, whatever 'arbitrary' might mean)."); Larry I. Palmer, Two Perspectives on Structuring
Discretion:Justices Stewart and White on the Death Penalty, 70J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 194,
198-99 (1979) (noting that Justice White is "more concerned that [those who deserve
death] are condemned than with whether the system makes a 'mistake' and condemns a
murderer who does not deserve the penalty"); Carol S. Steiker &Jordan M. Steiker, Let God
Sort Them Out? Refining the IndividualizationRequirement in CapitalSentencing, 102 YALE LJ.
835, 863 (1992) (book review) (observing that "pre-Furmancapital sentencing schemes
were objectionable not simply because they resulted in overinclusive application of the
death penalty, but also because they led to underinclusion"). Others are troubled by the
inequality of sparing those who are more deserving of death than those actually condemned. Cf. Givelber, supranote 29, at 894 (hypothesizing an instance of a death-ineligible defendant who is arguably more deserving of death than a death-eligible defendant);
Howe, supra note 27, at 386 (same).
64 See, e.g., Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2634 (1994) ("Our capital punishment cases under the Eighth Amendment address two different aspects of the capital decisionmaking process: the eligibility decision and the selection decision."); Lowenfield v.
Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988) (same).
65 See, e.g., Gillers, supra note 35, at 29-31; Sundby, supra note 23, at 1180-81.
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For example, some states make murder committed in an "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" manner an aggravating circumstance. 6 6 If the jury finds the crime was committed in this fashion, the
defendant becomes death-eligible. The state has decided that a defendant guilty of a "heinous" murder is, all else being equal, more
deserving of death than a defendant guilty of a "nonheinous" murder.
Still, death-eligibility means only that the defendant may deserve
death. It does not mean that he does in fact deserve it. In order to
reach thatjudgment, the jury must consider all the evidence in mitigation and aggravation. Only after receiving and deliberating on all the
evidence is the jury in any position to judge whether death is deserved. "Death-eligible" does not mean "death-deserving."
The two-stage system alleviates, but can never fully eliminate, the
problem of false-positives. It moderates the problem inasmuch as
those who fall within the rule-defined death-eligible class are not automatically condemned to death. The jury must still decide whether
death is the deserved punishment for any particular class member.
Dividing the process likewise alleviates the risk that a jury, otherwise
left to its own devices without any rules to guide it, might mistakenly
condemn undeserving defendants to death. In a two-stage system, the
jury exercises moral judgment only over members of the death-eligible class, and the moral guilt of this group's members is, all else being
equal, greater than that of nonmembers. 67 Consequently, less room
exists for the jury to make a mistake. In short, the two principles work
hand-in-hand to structure a two-stage capital sentencing process that
reduces the incidence of false-positive moral error.
66 Circumstances of this type are considered aggravating in some tventy-ninejurisdictions and apply to 60-80% of all murders. See, e.g., James R. Acker & C.S. Lanier, "Parsing
This Lexicon ofDeath":"AggravatingFactorsin CapitalSentencing Statutes, 30 CRiM. L. BuLL. 107,
124-25 (1994). The Court has struggled to limit the potentially enormous scope of this
aggravator, with questionable success. See, e.g., Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474-78
(1993); Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1, 1 (1990) (per curiam); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.
639, 654 (1990); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363 (1988); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U.S. 420, 432-33 (1980). For criticisms of the Court's efforts, see, e.g., Michael Mello,
Florida's "Heinous, Atrocious or Cruel" Aggravating Circumstance: Narrowing the Class of DeathEligible Cases Without Making It Smaller, 13 STETSON L. Rv. 523 (1984); Randall K. Packer,
Struck By Lightning- The Elevation of ProceduralForm Over Substantive Rationality in Capital
SentencingProceedings, 20 N.Y.U. Rv. L. & Soc. CHMGE 641 (1993-94); Richard A. Rosen,
The "EspeciallyHeinous"Aggravating Circumstance in CapitalCases-The StandardlessStandard,
64 N.C. L. REv. 941 (1986); cf.PaulJ. Heald, Medea and the Un-Man: Literary Guidance in the
Determinationof Heinousness Under Maynard v. Cartwright, 73 TEx. L. Rnv. 571 (1995) (using
the works of Dante, Lewis and Euripides to create an ethical framework for determining
what constitutes an "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel murder").
67
In his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Callins, however, Justice Blackmun
suggested that singling out and imposing death on some members of this generally more
culpable group of death-eligible defendants and not on others might seem more arbitrary,
because members of this class are more alike than would be members of a larger class. See
Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1134 n.4 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari); see also Gillers, supra note 35, at 27-28.
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This is not to suggest that the existing system cannot be modified
to further reduce the risk of false-positive moral error. Abolish the
death penalty, for example, and the risk drops to zero, though at
some cost in false-negatives. Abolition, however, seems unlikely any
time soon. For the time being, the more realistic question is whether
the death-eligible class is too large. 68 Does it include some offenders
who, on reflection, we think do not usually deserve death? Perhaps
the death-eligible class should include only serial murderers. 69 Limiting the class in this fashion would reduce the incidence of false-positives and increase the consistency of the capital sentencing process.
Moreover, we might conclude that we can achieve these gains without
70
an unacceptably great increase in the incidence of false-negatives.
Taking this step would, however, require confronting hard questions of moral substance. 7 1 It would require identifying more precisely what makes an offender deserving of death. Some would say
this kind of question is not worth asking, either because no one de68 The death-eligible class today is about as large as it was before Furman. Consequently, today's capital sentencing schemes yield no greater consistency than did their preFurman predecessors. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 911 (1983) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("The only difference between Georgia's pre-Furman capital sentencing
scheme and the 'threshold' theory that the Court embraces today is that the unchecked
discretion previously conferred in all cases of murder is now conferred in cases of murder
with one statutory aggravating circumstance."); accord Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 360
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) ("[T]he Court has come full
circle, not only permitting but requiring what Furmanonce condemned.");Johnson v. Singletary, 938 F.2d 1166, 1180 (11th Cir. 1991) ("The Court has returned the law largely to
its pre-Furmanstate but has ratcheted the doctrine up one step from its starting point."),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 930 (1992); DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUALJUSTICE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY. A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYsis 102 (1990) (concluding that more than 90% of
those defendants eligible for death before Furmanwould be eligible after Furman); William
S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten
FloridaDeath Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 7 (1987-88) ("The pre-Furmansituation in
large part still exists."); Gillers, supranote 38, at 1061 (noting that only one statutory aggravating circumstance "satisf[ies] Furman"); Ledewitz, supra note 47, at 350 n.126 ("[I]t
would seem clear that to allow unbridled discretion in imposing the death penalty returns
the court to McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971)."); Steiker & Steiker, supra note
63, at 867 (noting that states have "largely reproduced the pre-Furmanscheme"); Steiker &
Steiker, supra note 23, at 373 (noting that "death-eligibility remains ... nearly as broad
[today] as under the expansive statutes characteristic of the pre-Furmanera"); Weisberg,
supranote 16, at 358 (describing the single-aggravator rule as an "aesthetic requirement").
For a more optimistic assessment of the existing doctrinal landscape, see Louis D.
Bilionis, LegitimatingDeath, 91 MicH. L. REv. 1643 (1993).
69 See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 23, at 415-18 (exploring ways to narrow the
death-eligible class).
70
Narrowing the death-eligible class might also help reduce the scourge of racial discrimination in capital sentencing. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 367 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). It is, of course, possible that racial discrimination would simply turn
up within the confines of a smaller death-eligible class.
71
See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1995) ("Further differentiating [between murderers who
deserve death and murderers who do not] would require some painful soul-searching
about the nature of human evil.").
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serves death or because the question itself makes no sense.72 The
point here is only to suggest that we are less likely to ask this kind of
question until we look beyond the formal principles of individualization and consistency. Focusing on those two principles tends to obscure critical substantive questions and usually leads straight to the
impasse of the paradox. Limiting the size of the death-eligible class is
perhaps the most commonly recommended way to get beyond this
impasse. 73 The next Part offers another.
II
THE PLACE OF MERCY IN THE PENALTY PHASE

The preoccupation with the paradox of capital sentencing has
kept other issues off the intellectual agenda. Among these is the role
of mercy in the penalty phase.
A. The Selection-Stage "Hodge-Podge"
The Constitution imposes some substantive limits on the power
of the state to impose the death penalty. At the threshold, death cannot be imposed for crimes other than murder.74 Moreover, within the
category of murder, the state cannot execute those under age sixteen, 73 those who did not intend to kill, 76 or those who become insane

after conviction and sentencing. 7 7 Finally, only an "aggravated" murder can render a defendant death-eligible. 78 These rules, derived
72

Or, some would say, because all aggravated murderers deserve death simply be-

cause they are guilty of aggravated murder. Indeed, far from limiting the size of the deatheligible class, the actual trend seems to be moving in the opposite direction.
73 See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 23, at 415-18 (analyzing strategies for narrowing the death-eligible class by state legislatures and by the Court); Kozinski & Gallagher,
supra note 71, at 29-30.
74 This is the proposition for which Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), is generally understood to stand. Treason might be the exception to this general rule limiting the
death penalty to murder. See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 23, at 417 n.300. But see
James G. Wilson, Chainingthe Leviathan: The UnconstitutionalityofExecuting Those Convicted of

Treason, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 99 (1983).
75
See Thompson v. Oklahoma 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion). See generally
VICTOR L STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FORJuvENILEs 21-40 (1987) (arguing that Eighth Amendment principles prohibit execution of those under eighteen).
76 More precisely, the state cannot execute those who were not "major participants"
in the crime and who did not display "reckless indifference" to the value of human life. See
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 138 (1987); see also Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986);
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
77 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
78 See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 876-78 (1983) ("[S]tatutory aggravating
circumstances play a constitutionally.necessary function at the stage of legislative definition: they circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty."); accord Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2634-35 (1994); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246
(1988); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 954 (1983); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428
(1980). This "single-aggravator" rule is best understood as an application of the proportionality doctrine. Cf Graham v. Collins, 501 U.S. 461, 501 (1993) (Stevens,J., dissenting)
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from the "proportionality" doctrine 79 and the "evolving standards of
decency" doctrine,8 ° set substantive constitutional limits on the deatheligible class. Once the defendant enters the death-selection stage,
however, these limits evaporate. 8 '
(describing the single-aggravator rule, or "narrowing requirement," as a "corollary to the
proportionality requirement").
79 See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Two things about the proportionality doctrine deserve mention. First, it is now confined to capital cases and exists only as a
shadow of its former self in noncapital cases. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001
(1991) (plurality opinion) (holding that the Eighth Amendment "forbids only extreme
sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime").
Second, although the proportionality doctrine has long been "informed by objective
factors to the maximum possible extent," Coker, 433 U.S. at 592, more recent articulations
have injected a heavier dose of positive indicia into the doctrine, so that it now approximates the "evolving standards" doctrine, see infra note 80. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (noting that "the two methodologies blend into one another");
Norman J. Finkel, CapitalFelony-Murder, Objective Indicia, and Community Sentiment, 32 ARIz.
L. REv. 819 (1990) (noting the importance of "community sentiment" in both the "evolving standards" and proportionality doctrines). If the proportionality doctrine is to retain
any independent vitality, however, the "Constitution contemplates that in the end [the
Court's] own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the
death penalty under the Eighth Amendment." Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (emphasis added);
accord Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833; Stanford, 492 U.S. at 392 (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf.Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 986 (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J.) ("The real
function of a constitutional proportionality principle, if it exists, is to enable judges to
evaluate a penalty that some assemblage of men and women has considered proportionate-and to say that it is not.").
80 See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). Two things about the evolving
standards doctrine likewise deserve mention. First, the Court's articulation of our evolving
standards depends critically on the methodology the Court uses to identify those standards. The Court today looks almost exclusively to the statutory enactments of state legislatures. If enough states allow the execution of a certain offender for a certain offense, then
the evolving standards doctrine will not stand in the way. See, e.g., Stanford, 492 U.S. at 391
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Stephen P. Garvey, Note, PoliticizingWho Dies, 101 YAtE LJ. 187,
191 (1991); cf.William J. Bowers et al., A New Look at Public Opinion on CapitalPunishment:
Wat Citizens and LegislatorsPrefer, 22 AM.J. Ciam. L. 77, 142 (1994) (noting that standards
of decency vary depending on how they are gauged and finding that most respondents
preferred life imprisonment with restitution over capital punishment). Justice Marshall
argued long ago in Furmanthat people would reject the death penalty if they understood
how it was actually administered. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); cf.Austin Sarat & Neil Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth
Amendment: Testing the MarshallHypothesis, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 171 (demonstrating that Marshall's hypothesis is empirically valid and that the results of the test may help to clarify the
proper role for public opinion).
Second, and more importantly, insofar as the evolving standards doctrine depends on
state law, its status as a constitutionaldoctrine is deeply suspect. A constitutional limitation
on state power that yields when enough states choose to exercise that power hardly seems
like a constitutionallimitation. See, e.g., Stanford, 492 U.S. at 391-92 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term-Foreword: Antidiscriminationand Constitutional Accountability (Wat the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARv. L. Rxv. 80, 144
(1991). But cf.Steiker & Steiker, supranote 63, at 848-55 (employing contemporary standards of decency as reflected in state statutes to define proper scope of mitigation in penalty phase but recognizing limitations of methodology).
81 Although narrowing the death-eligible class is one of the most promising ways to
reform capital sentencing, see supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text, the Court's cur-
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During the death-selection stage, the Constitution entitles the defendant, and allows the state, to introduce almost anything. With respect to mitigation, the jury cannot be precluded from considering
"any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense ... proffer[ed] as a basis for a sentence less
than death."8 2 With the exception of invidious factors, such as race,
and totally irrelevant factors, such as how often the defendant showers, the jury must consider whatever mitigating evidence the defendant produces. With respect to aggravation, the Court will uphold
any nonvague aggravating circumstance, so long as that circumstance
can "reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on
the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder."8 3 Moreover, once the jury finds a statutory aggravating circumstance, the
state is free to introduce any nonstatutory aggravating evidence it
wishes, provided the evidence relates to some "aspect of the defendant's character or record" or to some "circumstance of the
84
offense."
What is most striking about the death-selection stage is its laissezfaire character. Once the defendant passes the critical threshold of
death-eligibility and enters the individualized death-selection stage,
the penalty phase becomes almost wholly unregulated. The individualization principle, which governs this second stage, has accordingly
been characterized as imposing "no substantive limitation at all."8
Some commentators see this lack of substance as a plus, arguing that
it conveniently circumvents difficult moral questions about whatjustifies imposing death on this or that defendant and leaves the jury free
to decide for itself whether death is an appropriate sanction.8 6 Other
commentators deplore this state of affairs, arguing that the death-selection stage has become a free-for-all in which the defendant introduces whatever he thinks will secure a life sentence, and the state
introduces whatever it thinks will secure a death sentence. Indeed,
one court aptly characterized the death-selection stage as a "hodge8 7
podge."
If we assume that the goal of the penalty phase is to impose the
death penalty only when it is deserved, this lack of substantive regulation at the selection stage is a distinct failing. If a jury is free to imrent approach to the proportionality and evolving-standards doctrines suggests that any
narrowing is unlikely to come from the Court.
82 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
83
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
84 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.
85 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 63, at 858.
86 Bilionis, supra note 27, at 301 (arguing that Lockett contains "no reference to any
particular moral theory" and this "moral neutrality" is a "considerable achievement").
87 United States v. Davis, 904 F. Supp. 554, 559 (E.D. La. 1995).
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pose death on the basis of facts and circumstances that shed no light
on the defendant's just deserts, we run an unnecessary risk that the
jury will impose death on defendants who do not deserve it. Moreover, as long as we continue to view the death-selection decision as an
undifferentiated m6lange or hodge-podge, our understanding of the
penalty phase will remain incomplete. We will overlook the role of
mercy in capital sentencing and how we might restructure the penalty
phase in order to accommodate mercy. 88
B.

Moral Desert and Mercy

Retributivism holds that punishment is justified when it is deserved. How much punishment a defendant deserves depends on
how much harm he caused and the culpability with which he caused
it.89 The greater the harm a defendant causes the more severely he
deserves to be punished. Likewise, the more culpable a defendant
is-the more morally responsible he is for what he has done-the
more severely he deserves to be punished. Finally, retributivism is deontological and backward-looking. In contrast to forward-looking
consequentialist approaches that justify punishment in the name of
what might be, retributivism justifies punishment in the name of what
has been. Punishment strictly predicated on moral desert is blind to
the future.
Once we identify the punishment a defendant deserves, we face a
fork in the philosophical road, for retributivism comes in two very different varieties. 90 The first-strong retributivism-places an obligation
on the sentencer to impose the punishment the offender deserves. 9'
88 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 23, at 414.
89 See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 461; ROBERT NoziCK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 363 (1981); C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT. A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTiON 155 (1987) ("According to the retributivist, the moral seriousness of an offence is a
function of two major factors-the harm done by the offence and the culpability of the
offender as indicated by his mental state at the time of committing the offence."); ANDREW
VON HmSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES 64-67 (1985); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOINGJUsTICE 69
(1976) [hereinafter VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE] ("'Seriousness' depends both on the
harm done (or risked) by the act and on the degree of the actor's culpability."); Michael
Davis, Harm and Retribution, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 236, 254 (1986); George P. Fletcher, What
Is Punishment Imposed For?, 5 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 101, 107 (1994); Edward M. Wise,
The Concept ofDesert, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1343, 1352 (1987) (noting that "two leading components of desert" are culpability and harm); cf.Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199, 2211
(1995) (Stevens,J., dissenting) ("Traditional sentencing practices recognize that ajust sentence is determined in part by the character of the offense and in part by the character of
the offender.").
90
See genera/yJohn Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238 (1979) (attempting to categorize the various forms of retribution).
91 Kant is perhaps the most well-known strong retributivist. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT,
THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (John Ladd trans., 1965). However, some have
questioned whether Kant even had a "theory of punishment." See, e.g., Jeffiie G. Murphy,
Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 509 (1987).
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The second-weak retributivism-merely authorizes the sentencer to
impose the deserved punishment, thus leaving room for the exercise
of mercy. For the weak retributivist, justice imposes no obligation to
impose deserved punishment. It only confers a right to do so. Mercy
consists in the supererogatory waiving of that right. At its most basic,
an act of mercy is simply a decision to impose less punishment than is
92
deserved.
The idea of mercy makes sense only within a retributive approach
to punishment 93 This is partly because retributivism is a multi-principled, or at least a dual-principled, ethic. In contrast, a utilitarian approach to punishment is monistic. The only relevant inquiry for a
utilitarian sentencer is whether the punishment she imposes, taking
into account the suffering of the defendant offset against the benefits
his suffering brings to society, will produce a net increase in overall
utility. This single-minded focus on utility washes away any distinction
between imposing a punishment because it is deserved and imposing
a punishment less than is deserved as an act of mercy. In short,
whereas retributivism can at least contemplate the possibility of mercy,
utilitarianism cannot.
Mercy finds its home within a retributive philosophy of punishment and consists, most simply, of imposing less punishment than is
deserved. The moral status of mercy and its relationship to justice,
however, remain matters much in dispute. 94 Mercy, Shakespeare tells
us, is a gentle virtue twice over.95 It shines on its giver, who reveals in
his act of mercy a character and disposition gentler than justice demands of him, and it shines also on its beneficiary, who receives a
punishment gentler than he deserves. Yet mercy is not only gentle, it
is also puzzling. It may even be immoral. This is so precisely because
mercy, being gentler than justice, stays the heavier hand of deserved
92
See, e.g.,JOHN BRAITHwAITE & PHILIP PETIT, NOTJUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINALJuSTICE 168 (1990) ("[M]ercy is simply refraining, for good reasons, from
imposing legally legitimate punishment.");JoHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 88 n.28

(1973) (stating that although "moral considerations determine merciful treatment, I do
not think they are desert considerations."); SADURSKI, supranote 54, at 240 ("Mercy, strictly,
means that ajudge... decides to impose less than just punishment."); Murphy, Forgiveness,
Mercy, and the RetributiveEmotions, supranote 9, at 39 ("[T]o show mercy... is necessarily to
act (and not just feel) in a certain way.").
93 See, e.g., K.G. Armstrong, The Retributivist Hits Back, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 138, 155 (H.B. Acton ed., 1969); cf. MARVIN HENBERG, RETRIBUTION: Evi.. FOR EVIL IN

ETHIcS, LAW, AND LrrERATUtRE 5 (1990) ("[F]orgiveness is a derivative act-at home con-

ceptualIy only in a larger panorama where retribution is the normal response to deliberate
evil."); Smart, supra note 9, at 356 (arguing that "[t]he notion of mercy seems to get a grip
only on a retributivist view of punishment" because utilitarianism reduces everything to
one value (utility) whereas retributivism is a "multi-principled" ethic).
94 See sources supra note 9.
95 See Shakespeare, supra note 1, at act 4, sc.1.
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punishment and stops justice from being done.9 6 When measured
against the demands of justice, therefore, mercy seems to grant its
97
recipient an unwarranted and illegitimate windfall.
Whether an act of mercy is inescapably unjust or immoral, mercy
and justice are not the same thing, though the two are often confused.
According to some, mercy merely requires that a decisionmaker pay
attention to those moral particulars she would otherwise ignore under
a rule-based decisionmaking regime. This view locates mercy in the

grand tradition of equity and treats it as a means of ameliorating the
injustice attributable to the strict application of rules. It fails, however, to treat mercy as a distinct and autonomous moral notion.
Moreover, although mercy does indeed require individualization and
attention to moral particulars, so too does justice. 98 Treating mercy as
if it were simply a species of equity erroneously reduces mercy to justice. Individualization alone, therefore, is an inadequate account of
mercy.
An adequate account requires a substantive dimension. Mercy
and justice differ insofar as they attend to different constellations of
moral particulars. 99 In other words, inasmuch as the decision to grant
mercy is based on reasons, the domain of reasons on which a sentencer can legitimately rely in assessing deserved punishment is distinct from the domain of reasons on which she can legitimately rely
when deciding to grant mercy. 10 0 Justice (desert) looks only to the
96 See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 9, at 108; Smart, supra note 9, at 349 ("One of the
other things we mean when we talk about showing mercy, is deciding not to inflict what is
agreed to be the just penalty, all things considered.").
97 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 9, at 559; Simmonds, supra note 9, at 53 ("Mercy seems
to require a departurefrom justice, and therefore to require injustice."); Walker, supra note
9, at 30 ("[T]empering [justice] is tampering [with it]."). But cf. Murphy, Forgiveness,
Mercy, and the RetributiveEmotions, supra note 9, at 14 (noting view that mixing justice with
mercy makes it stronger).
98 See, e.g., Murphy, Forgiveness, Mercy, and the Retributive Emotions, supra note 9, at 12
("This demand for individuation-a tailoring of our retributive response to the individual
natures of the persons with whom we are dealing-is a part of what we mean by taking
persons seriously as persons and is thus a basic demand ofjustice."); see also KLINiG, supra
note 92, at 88 (noting a sense of"mercy" in which "mercy is not opposed to justice as such
but to justice as it has been solidified in a system of legal rules"); SADumsiu, supra note 54, at
240 (noting that imposing less punishment than that "dictated by the strict application of
law" is not "genuine 'mercy'").
99 See, e.g., Dressler, Hating Criminals, supra note 9, at 1471 n.89 (implicitly noting
distinction between mercy-based and desert-based reasons); Harwood, supra note 9, at 466
("[W]hen other moral factors provide reasons for mercy, they can outweigh and override
our reason and prima facie duty to punish."); cf. Hugo A. Bedau, A Retributive Theory of the
PardoningPower?, 27 U. RPci. L. REv. 185, 194-95 (1992) (distinguishing between the claim
that one deserves less punishment from the claim that one's punishment ought to be
reduced).
100 Mercy is here treated as a power that can properly be vested in an agency of the
state, but this view is controversial. See, e.g., Harrison, supranote 9, at 108 ("[A] state cannot be merciful."); Stephen J. Morse, Justice, Mercy, and Craziness, 36 STAN. L. Ruv. 1485,
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facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant's culpable wrongdoing. Mercy is not so constrained, countenancing facts and circumstances stretching well beyond the legitimate sphere of justice's
influence. Mercy knows reasons which justice knows not.10 '
That we look to some facts and circumstances to decide what justice requires and to others to decide if mercy is appropriate may not
be the only difference between them. A full account of the difference
might also involve the moral character of the mercy-giver. When a
person acts unjustly, he is rightly criticized for what he has done. His
obligation to do justice is independent of his character. The same
does not seem true of mercy.' 0 2 Whether a defendant receives mercy
may depend-and legitimately so-as much on the character of the
mercy-giver as on the constellation of moral particulars to which the
mercy-giver attends. However, although a defendant is entitled to a
just sentencer, he is not entitled to a merciful one.
The goal here is not to examine how mercy may or may not depend on the character of the sentencer. The goal is rather to identify
the moral particulars on which a sentencer might rely in deciding
whether to grant mercy. First, however, we need to distinguish two
conceptions of mercy.' 0 3 As discussed earlier, retributivism comes in
two varieties, weak and strong. Mercy is compatible only with the
weak variety. Mercy, too, can be usefully divided into strong and weak
varieties. The strong conception of mercy allows the sentencer to consider only those facts and circumstances that are likely to elicit a
merciful response. This conception is strong because the sentencer
1509 (1984) (book review) (remarking that "[giranting mercy cannot be the law's business."); Walker, supra note 9, at 30-31 ("Agents of the State cannot properly act on behalf
of private individuals."); cf. Margaret R. Holmgren, Forgivenessand the Intrinsic Value of Persons, 30 Am. PHIL. Q. 341, 341 (1993) ("Only those who have been injured are properly
situated to forgive."). Murphy would allow the state to dispense mercy, but only as an
agent of the victim (i.e., only if the victim chose to be merciful). Murphy, Forgiveness,
Mercy, and the Retributive Emotions, supranote 9, at 13.
101 This paraphrase is purloined from Pascal, quoted in Pillsbury, supra note 14, at 710
("The heart has its reasons, which reason knows not.") (quoting BLA.Sn PASCAL, PENSE-S
343 (H.F. Stewart ed., 1950)).
102 See, e.g., Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 102 (suggesting that mercy is an "inclination of
the soul to mildness in exacting penalties"); see also Muller, supranote 9, at 307 ("Mercy is
not an action at all; rather it is an attitude that influences and guides the action that the
sentencer ultimately takes."); cf. Allen Buchanan, Justice and Charity, 97 ETHics 558, 569
n.22 (1987); Harwood, supra note 9, at 469.
103 What is here called "mercy" should be kept distinct from what others have called
.general deserts." See Howe, supra note 27, at 351 (distinguishing between "culpability"
and "general deserts"). Both ideas are similar insofar as they distinguish between two different kinds of reasons for imposing punishment: those reasons that illuminate what punishment a defendant deserves and those that function in some other way. The difference
between treating this latter set of reasons as bearing on "general deserts," rather than on
mercy, comes down to this: The former characterization implies that a defendant is entitled
to have his sentence reflect these reasons. The latter characterization, in contrast, carries
no such implication.
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never hears anything about the character of the offender or circumstances of the offense that might persuade her not to extend mercy.
The weak conception of mercy, in contrast, is not so limited and allows the sentencer to consider facts and circumstances that weigh
againstgranting mercy. Under this conception, mercy is a gift the defendant can seek, but it is also one the state can rightly urge the jury'
to withhold.
The strong conception of mercy draws support from the principle of in favorem vitae,10 4 since a sentencer is more likely to grant
mercy if the only pleas she hears are in favor of mercy. The weak
conception, however, is more in keeping with the existing structure of
the penalty phase. The penalty phase is in many ways like a trial. The
proceeding is adversarial, and the state and the defendant each present evidence and argument to the trier of fact supporting their position. Once the state has proven the existence of at least one
nonvague, aggravating factor, however, the defendant no longer en10 5
joys many of the legal advantages he did during the guilt phase.
The penalty phase is more or less a "level playing field" where the
state and the defendant stand on an equal footing. The weak conception of mercy is more faithful to this structure.
C.

Reconstructing the Penalty Phase

Incorporating a weak conception of mercy into the capital sentencing process requires a conceptual reconstruction of the penalty
phase. As explained earlier, the penalty phase is currently composed
of two stages: the death-eligibility stage and the death-selection stage.
The distinction between desert and mercy suggests that the second
stage-the death-selection stage-is more complex than commonly
thought. For once we flesh out the proper role of mercy, the penalty
phase includes three levels, rather than two.
The first level is the familiar death-eligibility stage. The second
level is the "desert phase" of the death-selection stage. During this
phase the jury must determine if the defendant deserves death. As
suggested in Part I, these two levels share the common goal of imposing deserved punishment. What separates them are the different
"In favor of life."

BALLTIrNE's LAW DIariONARY 619 (3d ed. 1969).
The state is not, for example, required to "prove" that the defendant deserves the
death penalty "beyond a reasonable doubt." See, e.g., Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 81719 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (rejecting reasonable doubt requirement in capital sentencing), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983); see also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878-79 (1983);
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825-27 (1991); Dubber, supra note 14, at 87 (stating that
the Court "has established a level playing field"). But see Linda E. Carter, A Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard in Death Penalty Proceedings: A Neglected Element of Fairness, 52 OHIO ST.
LJ. 195, 196 (1991) (arguing that the state should be required to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt" that death is the deserved punishment).
104
105
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modes of decisionmaking they employ. The first is rule-bound, while
the second is individualized. The third level becomes what we might
call the "mercy phase" of the death-selection stage. During this phase,
the jury must decide whether to grant the defendant mercy.
Under this proposed reconstruction, the death-selection stage
has two goals. The first is to enable the jury to determine what punishment the defendant deserves. The second is to afford it an opportunity to show mercy. The mercy phase, together with the desert
phase, would thus make up two separate and distinct moments in the
death-selection decision.' 0 6 These two phases are similar insofar as
both rely on individualized decisionmaking, but they differ insofar as
the purpose of the former is to impose just deserts, while the purpose
of the latter is to allow for the possibility of mercy.
Setting aside for the moment how this conceptual distinction
might actually be implemented, the more immediate task is to begin
identifying which facts and circumstances now lumped together in the
death-selection stage should be allocated to the mercy phase and
which should be left in the desert phase. Penalty-phase evidence is
usually classified as either "aggravating" or "mitigating." The distinction between desert and mercy cuts across this dichotomy. Aggravating evidence can be aggravating either because it provides a reason to
believe death is deserved ("desert-aggravating"), or because it provides
a reason not to extend mercy ("mercy-aggravating"). Likewise, mitigating evidence can be mitigating either because it provides a reason
to believe death is not deserved ("desert-mitigating"), or because it
provides a reason to extend mercy ("mercy-mitigating").1 °7 Existing
doctrine ignores these distinctions.
The rich universe of evidence now admitted in the penalty phase
must belong either to the domain of mercy or to the domain ofjustice. But figuring out which is tricky. For example, does victim impact
evidence help us decide what punishment is deserved, or only
whether to grant or withhold mercy? What about character evidence?
What about evidence of future dangerousness? We now turn to these
questions.

106

Cf Michael Davis, How To Make the Punishment Fit the Crime 93 ETHics 726, 750-52

(1983) (distinguishing between "retribution stage" and "clemency stage" of sentencing);
Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96
COLUM. L. Rnv. 269, 368 (1996).
107 Cf Davis, supranote 57, at 88-89 (distinguishing between "first-stage" and "second-

stage" aggravating evidence).
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Victim Impact Evidence

In most states, ajury can sentence a defendant to death based on
the suffering he causes his victim and his victim's family.' 08 Evidence
presented through so-called "victim impact statements" usually falls
into one of two major categories: evidence about the victim and the
victim's life, or evidence about the impact of the crime on the victim's
family. 109
The Supreme Court first considered victim impact evidence in
Booth v. Maryland."0 In Booth, the victims' family members described
in detail how the defendant's crime had changed their lives."' Writing for a bare majority over a strong dissent, Justice Powell suggested
that such evidence bore no rational relationship to the defendant's
moral guilt and should therefore be excluded from the penalty phase.
Unless the defendant was aware of the details of his victim's life, his
family, and his place in the community at the time of the crime, he
could not have known the full extent of the harm he would cause and
therefore should not be held accountable for it. Punishment, the
Booth Court implied, was properly a function of the harm one causes,
2
but only insofar as the harm is foreseen or reasonably foreseeable."
Although the rule articulated in Booth was extended two years
later in South Carolinav. Gathers," 3 the Booth dissenters eventually prevailed." 4 Speaking through Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court in
108 Most states now allow victim impact evidence to be introduced at the penalty phase.
See, e.g., State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 177-78 (N.J. 1996) (collecting cases).
109 A third category includes evidence about what sentence the victim's family thinks is
appropriate. Victim impact evidence of this kind is probably inadmissible. See, e.g., Payne
v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830 n.2 (1991); id. at 835 n.1 (SouterJ., concurring); State v.
Fautenberry, 650 N.E.2d 878, 882 (Ohio), cert. denieA, 116 S. Ct. 534 (1995); Kathryn E.
Bartolo, Payne v. Tennessee: The FutureRole of Victim Statements of Opinionin CapitalSentencing Proceedings, 77 IowA L. REv. 1217, 1221-22 (1992).
110 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
111 The victim's experiences were compiled in a victim impact statement, which was
then read to the jury. Id. at 496-501.
112 Id. at 504 (victim impact evidence "may be wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness
of a particular defendant."); cf. van den Haag, supranote 63, at 167 ("Retribution for the
suffering of the individual victims, however much deserved, is not punishment.... .").
113 490 U.S. 805 (1989) (extending Booth to cover prosecutorial comments about the
victim), overruled by Payne, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
114 In the meantime, the Court's membership had changed. Justice Powell retired and
was replaced by Justice Kennedy. Although Justice Kennedy voted with the dissenters in
Gathers, Justice White, who had dissented in Booth, voted with the majority in Gathers, saying
only that unless Booth was overruled, it controlled the disposition in Gathers. Justice Brennan also retired, and was replaced byJustice Souter. who voted with the majority in Payne
See, e.g., David R. Dow, When Law Bows to Politics:Explaining Payne v. Tennessee, 26 U.C.
DAVIs L. REV. 157 (1992).
The commentary on Payne has been almost uniformly negative. See Susan Bandes,
Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHi. L. REv. 361, 410 (1996) ("The
victim impact statement dehumanizes the defendant and employs the victim's story for a
particular end: to cast the defendant from the human community."); Vivian Berger, Payne
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Payne v. Tennessee"1 5 overruled both Booth and Gathers,noting that they
"were decided by the narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents." 116
Payne dealt at length with the supposed unfairness of allowing the defendant, as was his right under Lockett, to portray himself to the jury as
a "unique human being," while the victim remained a "'faceless stranger."'1

7

The more important question, however, is whether the "hu-

manization" of the victim through victim impact evidence casts any
light on a defendant's just deserts.
Before Payne, the Court accepted the following syllogism: (1) a
death sentence should reflect the defendant's moral blameworthiness;
(2) the only harm for which a defendant is morally blameworthy is the
harm he foresaw or could reasonably have foreseen; (3) victim impact
evidence is evidence of harm the defendant could not have reasonably
foreseen; (4) therefore, victim impact evidence is irrelevant to the
death-selection decision."18 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority in Payne, seemed to accept the first proposition, that the
death-selection decision should reflect the defendant's moral blameworthiness, but reject the second. According to this view, moral
blameworthiness can depend upon unforeseen and unforeseeable
harm. 119
and Suffering-A PersonalReflection and a Victim-C entered Critique, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 21
(1992) (contending that Payne actually represents a step back for victims' rights); Angela P.
Harris, The Jurisprudenceof Victimhood, 1991 Sup. CT. REV. 77, 78 (arguing that "Paynesubmerges rather than acknowledges the equality issues embedded in decisions about death");
R.P. Peerenboom, Victim Harm, Retribution and CapitalPunishment: A PhilosophicalCritiqueof
Payne v. Tennessee, 20 PEPP. L. REv. 25 (1992) (maintaining that victim impact statements
are relevant only to the degree that the defendant was aware of the victim's unique characteristics and family background); Michael Vitiello, Payne v. Tennessee: A "StunningIpse
Dixit,"8 NoTRE DAMSEJ.L. ETHics & Pus. POL'Y 165 (1994) (arguing Paynedid not meet the
necessary criteria for overruling recent precedent); see alsoJonathan H. Levy, Note, Limiting Victim Impact Evidence After Payne v. Tennessee, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1993). But see
Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs at the Criminal Tria 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 863 (1996). On the
role of victims in the criminal process more generally, see Andrew Ashworth, Victim Impact
Statements and Sentencing, 1993 GRIM. L. REV. 498; Abraham S. Goldstein, Defining the Role of
the Victim in CriminalProsecution,52 Miss. LJ. 515 (1982); Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs
of Victims'Rights, 37 STAN. L. REv. 937 (1985).
115 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
116 Id. at 829. For a discussion of Pane's treatment of precedent, see Vitiello, supra
note 114; see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in ConstitutionalDecisionmaking
and Theory, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 68, 129 (1991).

1'7

Payne, 501 U.S. at825 (quoting Gathers,490 U.S. at 821 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting)).
Id. at 818-19.
119 In his concurring opinion, Justice Souter appeared to reject proposition (3). He
argued that victim impact statements should be admissible because every "[m]urder has
foreseeable consequences" and "evidence of the specific harm caused [i.e., victim impact
evidence] when a homicidal act is realized is nothing more than evidence of the risk that
the defendant originally chose to run." Id. at 838 (Souter,J., concurring); see also Gewirtz,
supra note 114, at 873 ("The account of the suffering of the victim's survivors in individual
cases is a particularization of a generally foreseeable harm."). Although it seems plausible
to impute to a murderer knowledge that "murder has foreseeable consequences" and that
118
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At root, victim impact evidence raises what philosophers generally call the problem of "moral luck." 20 Take two defendants, both of
whom commit capital murder. In one case, the victim is without
friends or kin; in the other, she is the loving mother of four. In
neither case did the defendant know who his victim was, nor could he
have reasonably foreseen how his crime would ripple into the future.
From all outward appearances, the victims and the crimes were indistinguishable. Nonetheless, one might contend that the first defendant deserves a lesser punishment, because he caused less actual
harm, while the second deserves a greater punishment, because he
caused more actual harm. It was, however, only a matter of luck that
the first defendant's victim was a loner and the second defendant's
victim a mother of four. Such luck, one might argue, should have no
bearing on how severely a person is punished. As much as possible,
punishment should be immune from luck's vagaries.
Payne rejects this immunity-from-luck principle. The Court noted
how the law already allows luck to affect punishment.' 2 ' The law of
attempts, for example, punishes a robber who alms, shoots and hits
his victim more harshly than it does one who aims, shoots and
misses. 12 2 Both robbers are equally blameworthy if the only measure

of blameworthiness is the harm they intend to cause. The only difference between the two is that one actually succeeded in causing the
harm he intended. 123 This difference, however, is only a matter of
the act will cause harm beyond the immediate death of the victim, it seems implausible to
impute to him knowledge of the specific and highly detailed harm conveyed by victim
impact evidence. Cf livingston v. State, 444 S.E.2d 748, 759 (Ga. 1994) (Benham,J., dissenting) (describing victim impact statement as "detailed narration of the emotional and
economic sufferings of the victim's family and members of the victim's community resulting from the victim's death" that could not have been foreseen).
120 See generally Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck in MORTAL QUESTIONS 24 (Thomas Nagel
ed., 1979); Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, in MoRAL LUCK 20 (Bernard Williams ed., 1981);
see also Steven Sverdlik, Crime and MoralLuck, 25 AM. PHIL. Q. 79 (1988) (arguing that the
theory of moral luck is "riddled with difficulties"); Kimberly D. Kessler, Note, The Role of
Luck in the Criminal Law, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 2183 (1994) (describing the general idea of
"moral luck" and offering practical solutions).
121
See, e.g., Payne, 501 U.S. at 819-20; see also United States v. Martinez, 16 F.3d 202, 206
(7th Cir.) (Posner, C.J.) ("'[M] oral luck' as philosophers refer to distinctions in culpability
that are based on consequences rather than intentions, is, rightly or wrongly, a pervasive
characteristic of moral thought in our society, at least the moral thought that informs the
criminal law."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 226 (1994).
122

Payne, 501 U.S. at 819.

123 Other suggested explanations for why the law punishes failed attempts less harshly
than completed crimes include treating failed attempts as evidence that the defendant did
not really intend to cause harm after all (thus making the attempt less deserving of punishment), and offering an incentive for the would-be offenders to desist. See, e.g., Gall Heriot,
The PracticalRole of Harm in the CriminalLaw and the Law of Tort, 5J. CoNTFP. LEGAL ISSUES
145, 147-48 (1994); Barbara Herman, Feinbergon Luck and FailedAttempts, 37 APiz. L. REv.
143, 145 (1995).
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luck. The Payne majority saw no need to give capital defendants special treatment. Actual harm matters.
The problem of moral luck defies easy solution. Some urge that
only intended harm is relevant to deserved punishment, 124 while
others insist, as did the Court in Payne, that actual harm is also relevant. 125 Insofar as victim impact evidence raises the problem of moral
luck, no simple solution exists. We can, however, find another way to
look at the problem.
Both the majority and dissent in Payne assumed that the relevance
of victim impact evidence turned on its relationship with moral desert.
In a restructured penalty phase, however, victim impact evidence
would be admitted not on the question of desert, but on the question
of mercy. Once the jury concludes the defendant deserves death, the
state would be allowed to introduce victim impact evidence, but only
to defeat the defendant's plea for mercy. Conversely, if the victim's
family members were willing to testify for the defendant, a rare but
not unknown occurrence, 126 they would be permitted to do so, but
only during the mercy stage. This approach to victim impact evidence
respects the principle that capital defendants should be punished only
for harm they could reasonably foresee causing, while at the same
time allowing actual harm, foreseeable or not, to play a role in the
final outcome. Actual but unforeseeable harm would play a role in

124
See generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME 200 (1995) ("The offender is not accountable, not blameworthy, for things of which he or she is faultlessly
ignorant."); TEN, supra note 89, at 157 ("[R]etributivists ought to accept the view that a
person's culpability for his or her actions should not be affected by chance events over
which the agent had no control and could not reasonably have foreseen."); Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 2 (1994) (presenting normative
case for "centrality of the culpable act"); Lawrence C. Becker, CriminalAttempt and the Theory of the Law of Crimes, 3 PHIL. & PUB. Arr. 262, 275-76 (1974) (arguing that attempts and
successful crimes should be punished equally); Joel Feinberg, Equal Punishment for Failed
Attempts: Some Bad But InstructiveArguments Against It, 37 Aiuz. L. REv. 117 (1995); Sanford
H. Kadish, Foreword: The CriminalLaw and the Luck of the Draw, 84J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLoY' 679 (1994); Richard Parker, Blame, Punishment and the Role of Result, 21 AM. PHIL Q.
269, 273 (1984) ("Fortune may make us healthy, wealthy, or wise, but it ought not determine whether we go to prison."); Stephen Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of
Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the CriminalLaw, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1497 (1974).
125
See generally Andrew Ashworth, Taking the Consequences, in ACTION AND VALUE IN
CRIMINAL LAw 106, 117-120 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993); Bjorn Burkhardt, Is There a
Rational Justificationfor Punishing an Accomplished Crime More Severely Than an Attempted
Crime?, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 553; Michael Davis, Why Attempts Deserve Less Punishment than
Complete Crimes, 5 LAw & PHIL. 1 (1986); R.A. Duff, Auctions, Lotteries, and the Punishment of
Attempts, 9 LAW & PHIL 1 (1990); Michael Moore, The Independent Significance of Wrongdoing,
5J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 237 (1995);JudithJ. Thomson, TheDecline of Cause, 76 GEO. LJ.
137 (1987).
126
Don Terry, Victims' Families Fightfor Mercy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1996, at A1O.
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capital sentencing, but only as a factor in the jury's decision to exer12 7
cise mercy.
Payne responded to the widespread sentiment that crime victims
had been disregarded in the process of prosecution and punishment.
Hearing the voice of the victim at the mercy-phase will not satisfy victims' rights advocates who believe the victim's experience should help
us decide what punishment a criminal offender deserves, but it nonetheless recognizes some role for the victim. Solidarity with the victim
is affirmed, 12 8 but only to a point. This approach allows the victim's
12 9
voice to deny the defendant mercy, but not justice.
2.

CharacterEvidence

The more culpable a capital defendant is for his conduct, the
more deserving he is of death. 130 During the penalty phase the defendant must show that his culpability, although sufficient to convict him
of capital murder, does not warrant a capital sanction. 13 1 Something
"excuses" him from death. The Lockett doctrine governs what kinds of
facts and circumstances are considered mitigating. According to Lockett, the sentencer must be allowed to consider "any aspect of the defendant's character. . . and any of the circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death." 32 The range of mitigating evidence admissible under Lockett
127
Cf Jeffrie G. Murphy, GettingEven: The Role of the Victim, 7 Soc. PHIL. & PoL'y 209,
221 (1990) (noting that victim impact statements can "counter" sentiments of mercy).
128 See FLETCHER, supranote 124, at 203 ("A primary function of punishment.., is to
express solidarity with the victim.").
129 Whatever one thinks of this approach, victim impact evidence raises a host of
problems. First, victim impact evidence threatens to turn the penalty phase into an unseemly spectacle in which the defense, forced to respond to the state's case, puts the character and moral worth of the victim on trial. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 114, at 986;
Catherine Bendor, Note, Defendants' Wrongs and Victims' Rights, 27 HAv. C.R.-C.L L REV.
219, 238 (1992); Dow, supra note 114, at 163. Second, victim impact evidence threatens to
transform the penalty phase into a contest not between the state and the accused, but
between the victim and the accused. See, e.g., Dubber, supra note 14, at 152; Harris, supra
note 114, at 99. Finally, victim impact evidence threatens to accentuate the role of race in
capital sentencing. See id. at 96-98. These problems have persuaded some state courts to
reject Payne. See, e.g., Sermons v. State, 417 S.E.2d 144, 146 (Ga. 1992); Clark v. Commonwealth, 833 S.W.2d 793, 796-97 (Ky. 1991).
130 See, e.g., Andrew von Hirsch & Nils Jarenborg, Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living
StandardAnalysis, 11 OxroanJ. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1990) ("[C]ulpability... [refers to] the
factors of intent, motive and circumstance that determine the extent to which the offender
should be held accountable for the act.").
131 The Court has analogized mitigating circumstances to affirmative defenses. The
state can therefore impose upon the defendant the burden of proving the existence of
mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona,
497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990). The Court has not, however, treated aggravating circumstances
as elements of an offense requiring the state to prove their existence beyond a reasonable
doubt. See, e.g., John W. Poulos, Liability Rules, Sentencing Factors, and the Sixth Amendment
Right to ajury Trial: A PreliminaryInquiry, 44 U. MIAAI L. REv. 643, 725 (1990).
182 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
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is quite broad. Indeed, once we include mercy in the penalty phase,
Lockett is arguably too broad.
Although the Court has not developed any well-defined theory of
moral culpability, two distinct theories of mitigation explain most of
the evidence admissible under Lockett.133 The first theory, which
might be called the "will" or "choice" theory, holds an offender re34
sponsible for his act if and only if it was the product of his free will.'
In the substantive criminal law, this theory of culpability is embodied
3 5
in excuses such as insanity, duress, and involuntary intoxication.1
These doctrines reflect the more general principle that a criminal defendant should not be convicted if his act was not the product of free
will. However, these doctrines ordinarily shield an offender from
criminal liability only where his will has been almost completely overborne. 36 In capital cases that reach the penalty phase, the defendant
had no valid excuse. Any defect in the defendant's will is less than
total and merely mitigates the severity of his punishment. 3 7
133 These mitigation theories bear some resemblance to two other theories-the
"choice" theory and the "character" theory-which scholars have developed to explain and
justify the law of excuses in the substantive criminal law. Choice theorists include, for
example, Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL.L. REV. 257 (1987); Michael S. Moore,
Choice, Character,and Excuse, 7 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 29 (1990). Character theorists include,
for example, RICHARD B. BRANDT, A Motivational Theory of Excuses in the Criminal Law, in
MORALITY, UTILITARIANISM, AND RIGHTS 235 (1992); FLETCHER, supranote 9; Peter Arenella,
Character, Choice and Moral Agency: The Relevance of Characterto Our Moral CulpabilityJudgments, 7 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 59 (1990); Michael D. Bayles, Character,Purpose, and Criminal
Responsibility, 1 LAw & PHIL. 5 (1982); Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice, Character, and Responsibility, 67 IND. L.J. 719 (1992); Edmund L
Pincoffs, Legal Responsibility and Moral Character, 19 WAYNE L. RExv. 905 (1973); George
Vuoso, Background, Responsibility and Excuse, 96 YALE LJ. 1661 (1987). But cf.Meir DanCohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARv. L. RE,. 959, 973 (1992) (arguing that within the "constitutive paradigm" of responsibility "volition and character appear
as complimentary rather than as hostile or mutually exclusive sources of responsibility");
Michael Corrado, Notes on the Structure of a Theory of Excuses, 82J. ClM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
465 (1991); R.A. Duff, Choice, Character,and CriminalLiability, 12 LAw & PHIL. 345, 378
(1993) (arguing that "there is something spurious about the general controversy between
'choice' and 'character' theorists").
134 For the classic articulation of this theory in the substantive criminal law, see H.L.A.
HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILrIY 152 (1968); see also William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *20 (1769) ("All the several pleas and excuses... may be
reduced to this single consideration, the want or defect of wilL"). The "will" theory presupposes, as ultimately does the "character-will" theory, that the notion of free will can be
rescued from the threat of determinism. See generallyAndrew E. Lelling, EliminativeMaterialism, Neuroscience and the Criminal Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1471 (1993) (explaining the
historical and scientific roots of, and modem day challenges to, the notion that one is only
responsible for those actions which are the result of one's free will).
135 See generallyJoshua Dressier, Foreword-Justificationsand Excuses: A BriefReview of the
Concepts and the Literature, 33 WAYNE. L. REv. 1155, 1164 (1987) (discussing the law of excuses); Paul H. Robinson, CriminalLaw Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REA.

199, 221-22 (1982) (same).
136 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 135, at 222.
137 Some state capital statutes include as a mitigating factor that the "murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant believed to provide a moral justification
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The second theory, which might be called the "character-will"
theory, begins where the "will" theory ends. The will theory asks
whether the offense was the product of the defendant's free will. The
character-will theory, in contrast, locates responsibility not so much in
the defendant's free will, but in his character. Acts are understood as
the product of that stable and enduring structure of attitudes, concerns, and values forming one's character. 3 8 Culpable acts are in
39
turn understood as the product of a defective or evil character.
The condition of the actor's will at the time of the offense is
irrelevant.
Although the character-will theory begins with a shift in focus
from the offender's will to his character, it does not stop there. The
theory does not require the jury to determine whether the defendant's character itself warrants the death penalty. Instead, the jury
must first determine whether the defendant's action was consistent
with his character. If the defendant's act was "out of character," the
character-will theory treats as mitigating those facts and circumstances
that force a person "out of character," much as the will theory treats as
mitigating those facts and circumstances that overwhelm a person's
will. Indeed, when an offender has acted "out of character," the will
theory and the character-will theory overlap substantially, treating
much the same things as mitigating, but for different reasons.
However, if the defendant's act was not "out of character," the
jury must determine to what extent the defendant can be held responsible for the character he has. As problematic as it is,140 the central
or extenuation for his conduct." See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4). This mitigator
appears to be based more on a theory ofjustification than on extenuation. Most statutory
mitigating factors, however, appear to be based on a theory of imperfect excuse and diminished culpability. See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 63, at 848-49.
138 See, e.g., JOHN KEKES, FACING EvIL 104 (1990) ("[C]hoices... are... the epiphenomena of character"); Duff, supra note 125, at 352; Moore, supra note 133, at 42
("[C]haracter as I conceive it can cause the past behavior that evidences it and will or could
cause the future or hypothetical behavior that manifests it... ."); Pincoffs, supra note 133,
at 906 (defining "moral character traits" as a subclass of "personality traits [which are]
relatively stable and permanent disposition [s] by means of which one individual may be
distinguished from another."); cf.John R. Silber, Being andDoing: A Study of StatusResponsibility and Voluntary Responsibility, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 47, 90 (1967) ("There are gradations of
choice and degrees of voluntariness; at every instant, however, even in those acts of purest,
freest, most voluntary choice, choice depends upon the being of the person and the matrix
of his action .... ").
139
AIsToTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS TRANSLATED 7475 (JAY, Thomson trans., 1953). See, e.g., Pincoffs, supra note 133, at 919; cf. Calhoun,
supranote 9, at 93 (noting that sometimes "wrongdoing is less likely to be a blow directly
aimed at us than simply shrapnel from something else more complicated and more interesting in the person's life.").
14o
See Moore, supra note 133, at 45; see also Dan-Cohen, supra note 133, at 973 ("If
character traits are necessary to make choice intelligible and human action possible, how
do we account for the choices that lead to the formation of character?"); Dressier, Excusing
Wrongdoers, supranote 9, at 695-97; Moore, supranote 16, at 219 (suggesting that "[i]t is not
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inquiry for the character-will theory in this situation is the extent to
which a defendant can be held responsible for creating his malevolent
character, or for sustaining that character once formed.' 4 ' By introducing the idea of character into the penalty phase, the character-will
theory expands the relevant time-frame and increases the range of
potentially mitigating facts and circumstances. It requires the jury to
look beyond the immediate circumstances of the offense and to determine whether the defendant's character is the product of events beyond his control.
"Horrid backgrounds do not inevitably give rise to horrid people."' 42 Nonetheless, we often look less harshly on offenders who are
in some sense the products of such backgrounds. The stories of the
men and women on Death Row across the country are always the stories of people guilty of unspeakable acts. Almost as often, however,
they are the stories of lives whose formative years were filled with neglect, abuse, and despair. Most have themselves suffered unspeakable
acts, often inflicted at the hands of family members or others in positions of trust. 143 The character-will theory registers the significance of
these character-forming facts and makes them relevant to the assessment of a defendant's moral culpability. 4 4
Despite their differences, the will and character-will theories both
bear on the question of deserved punishment. Both ultimately
ground culpability in some conception of free choice. The will theory
holds a-defendant less culpable when something impairs the exercise
senseless to talk of control over our character"); Pillsbury, supra note 133, at 732; Gary
Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS, supra note 16, at 256, 281 (suggesting that responsibility for character presupposes
"a view of the self as an entity that mysteriously both transcends and intervenes in the
'causal nexus,' because it is both product and author of its actions and attitudes").
141
See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 805-06; Charles Taylor, Responsibilityfor Self, in
THE IDENTITIES OF PERSONS 281-99 (Amelie Rorty ed., 1976); Robert Audi, Responsible Action
and Virtuous Character,101 ETHICS 304 (1991); Pincoffs, supra note 133, at 920 ("[T]he
formation of one's character is neither entirely the doing of others nor entirely one's own
doing."); cf.California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,concurring).
142
Watson, supra note 140, at 277.
143
See, e.g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461 (1993);Jacobs v. Scott, 31 F.3d 1319 (5th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 711 (1995); see alsoWuornos v. State, 644 So.2d 1000 (Fla.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. CL 1705 (1995).
144 At its outer limit this theory would allow social deprivation to constitute a full defense to criminal liability. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the
CriminalLaw Recognize a Defense of Severe EnvironmentalDeprivation, 3 LAw & INEQUALITY 9
(1985); accordR. George Wright, TheProgressiveLogic of CriminalResponsibility and the Circumstances of the Most Deprived, 43 CATH. U.L. REv. 459 (1994); cf Daina C. Chiu, The Cultural
Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation, and Guilty Liberalism, 82 CAL. L.REv. 1053 (1994).
But cf ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCrIONS 98 ("The sentencing of convicted
persons cannot wait until underlying social ills are remedied, nor can it be abandoned
once they are addressed."); Moore, supra note 16, at 215 (suggesting that such an approach
"is elitist and condescending toward others [because it does not] grant [them] the same
responsibility and desert [one] grant[s] [to oneself].").
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of his free will. The character-will theory holds a defendant less culpable when his offense was the product of a corrupt character for which
he cannot be held responsible because it was not the character he
chose to make for himself. In short, both theories forge a link between the offender's act and his free will-one proceeding directly
from free will to the offense, and the other taking a detour through
the concept of character. In the end, however, the measure of deserved punishment under both theories depends on the choices the
defendant has made.
The will and character-will theories account for most of the evidence admitted under Lockett, but they leave out one important category-character evidence. The Court has suggested that Lockett is
broad enough to entitle a defendant to introduce evidence showing
he was, for example, a "fond and affectionate uncle." Such evidence
14 5
is, in the language of Lockett, an "aspect of a defendant's character."
The admissibility of this evidence rests on a theory, which we might
call simply the "character theory," that severs any link between the
offender's free will and his offense. This theory focuses not on the
extent to which the defendant's will was overcome, nor on the story
behind the formation of the defendant's character, but instead on the
content of the defendant's character itself. The character theory requires a jury to make a direct assessment of the defendant's moral
worth. It is concerned, as some might put it, with the state of the
1
defendant's "soul."

46

We might think a capital defendant should have every chance to
convince the jury to spare his life, including the chance to highlight
the redeeming aspects of his character. Not all evidence of a defendant's character will be mitigating, however. Indeed, the problem
with the character theory may not come into focus until we see what
happens when the state tries to highlight the darker side of the defendant's character.

145 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604; see alsoPayne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (good with
children; assisted father with painting); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 382 n.5 (1990)
(prize for dance choreography); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397 (1987); California
v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987) (peaceful nature); cf. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 178
(1988) ("We have never defined what... character" means.). Some commentators suggest

that the admission of character evidence into the penalty phase is entirely appropriate. See,
e.g., Howe, supra note 27, at 351, 355-57. Others argue that, whether appropriate or not,
"consideration of evidence of good character.., is [not] sufficiently rooted in societal
consensus to command constitutionalization." Steiker & Steiker, supra note 63, at 848.
146

See, e.g., Gary Goodpaster, The Trialfor Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death

Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rrv. 299, 303 (1983) (noting that a "central issue [in the penalty
trial] is the meaning and value of the defendant's life"); Weisberg, supra note 16, at 335
("The new [death penalty] laws of aggravation and mitigation make the defendant's whole
career and soul the subject of the penalty trial.").

1996]

MERCY IN CAPTIAL SENTFNCING1

1027

In Dawson v. Delaware,'47 the state tried to introduce evidence
showing that the defendant was a self-professed member of a racist
prison gang known as the Aryan Brotherhood. 148 The defendant argued that the First Amendment prohibited the state from asking the
jury to return a death sentence based on his constitutionally protected
right of association-here his membership in the Brotherhood. 4 9
Neither the defendant's membership in the Brotherhood, nor his racist beliefs, were in any way connected to his crime. The defendant
was white, as were his victims.' 5 0 The only reason for the state to disclose the defendant's membership in the Brotherhood was to show
that he was a racist. 151 Being a racist was, according to the state, one
reason among a host of other reasons why the defendant should be
executed.
The state's argument was simple: Membership in the Aryan
Brotherhood manifests a racist character; a racist character is a malevolent character; and having a malevolent character is a valid reason
for a capital sentencing jury to impose a death sentence. The Court's
response was just as simple. Evidence of the defendant's gang membership, ChiefJustice Rehnquist wrote for the Court, is "irrelevant" to
the "issue being decided in the [sentencing] proceeding." 52 This evidence, he continued, "prove[s] nothing more than the abstract beliefs" of the Brotherhood. 153 Unfortunately, the Chief Justice never
explained why one's abstract beliefs are "irrelevant" to the "issue be54
ing tried." Indeed, he failed to explain exactly what the "issue" was.1
147

503 U.S. 159 (1992).

The prosecution and the defense agreed to a stipulation describing the Aryan
Brotherhood as a "white racist prison gang that began in the 1960's in California in response to other gangs of racial minorities." Id. at 162. The state also introduced evidence
that Dawson called himself "Abaddon," which he said meant "one of Satan's disciples." Id.
at 161-62. The state also wanted to introduce evidence that Dawson had painted a swastika
on the wall of his prison cell, but the trial court ordered it excluded. Id. at 162.
149
Id. at 160. Dawson apparently did not challenge the admission of the evidence on
Eighth Amendment grounds. For present purposes, the case is interesting for what it
reveals about capital sentencing in general, whether or not it arrives at the correct result as
a matter of First Amendment doctrine.
148

150
151

Id. at 166.

The Court contrasted Dawson with Barclay v. Floridawhere the defendant's crime
was motivated by racial hatred. See id. at 164 (citing Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939
(1983)).
152
Id. at 159; cf. Beam v. Paskett, 966 F.2d 1563, 1572 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
defendant's "non-violent, consensual or involuntary sexual conduct" could not be admitted in capital sentencing proceeding).
153 Dawson, 503 U.S. at 159.
154 The Court did not hold that evidence of gang membership was always irrelevant.
On the contrary, it went out of its way to note that Dawson's membership in the Aryan
Brotherhood would have been relevant if the state had introduced competent evidence
that members of the Aryan Brotherhood are more likely to commit future violent acts.
The association would then be made relevant to future dangerousness, though not to char-
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Justice Thomas was the lone dissenter. Agreeing with a unanimous Delaware Supreme Court, 15 5 he argued that evidence of the defendant's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood is clearly relevant to
his sentence, at least if his sentence is meant to "reflect a 'reasoned
moral response' not only to the crime, but also to the 'background'
and 'character' of the defendant himself."15 6 In Justice Thomas's
view, a defendant's racial prejudice forms a constitutive element of his
character. It constitutes a piece of the puzzle of his soul. What the
majority dismissed as "irrelevant," Justice Thomas passionately argued,
could not be more relevant. Moreover, Justice Thomas reminded the
majority that Payne had rejected the idea of holding the state and the
defendant to different standards during the penalty phase. As long as
a capital defendant is permitted to introduce evidence of his good
character (e.g., through membership in various religious, fraternal,
and civic organizations), the state, Justice Thomas argued, should be
permitted to introduce evidence of bad character (e.g., through membership in less wholesome associations).
The majority in Dawson came close to saying that a capital defendant's bad character as such is simply irrelevant to the death-selection
decision. Although the majority does not say why this should be so, it
probably relied on the principle that punishment should be imposed
for what one does, not for who one is.157 From this viewpoint, the

punishment an offender receives should not depend on his character,
at least where the offender's character has no plausible connection

acter. See Dawson, 503 U.S. at 164. Yet future dangerousness has no more to do with assess-

ing a capital defendant's moral desert than does character. See infra part 1.C.3.
155 See Dawson v. State, 581 A.2d 1078, 1102-03 (Del. 1990), cert. granted,499 U.S. 946
(1991), vacated, 503 U.S. 159 (1992) ("Thejury was also required to make an individualized
determination of whether Dawson should be executed or incarcerated for life, based upon
Dawson's character, his record and the circumstances of the crime.") (emphasis added).
156 Dawson, 503 U.S. at 174 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302 (1989) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
157 Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding criminalization of"status"
of being narcotics addict to constitute cruel and unusual punishment); accord MICHAEL
MooRE, AcT AND CRIME 53 (1993); Hyman Gross, Benign and Malign Morality, in IN HARM's
WAY 344, 349 (Jules L. Coleman & Allen Buchanan eds., 1994) ("It is a fundamental principle of criminal justice that criminal liability be imposed only for what was done and not
because of the sort of person the person who did it has shown himself to be."); Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Federal ConstitutionalRestrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of
General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of DispleasingPolice Officers, and the Like, 3 CRiM. L. BuLL. 205
(1967); Moore, supra note 133, at 55 ("[N]o one deserves to be punished for being a poor
specimen of humanity.") (emphasis added). But cf Jeffrie Murphy, The State's Interest in
Retribution, 5 J. CoNTmsp. LEGAL IssuEs 283, 296 & n.36 (1994) (suggesting that a liberal

state can, consistent with its underlying principles, punish certain character defects, such
as "racial hatred, religious intolerance or failure to respect human rights," once defendant
is legitimately within its "clutches" for having violated criminal law).
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with his crime.' 5 8 Yet, as Justice Thomas rightly pointed out, the
Court requires capital sentencing juries to consider evidence relating to
the defendant's good character. According to Justice Thomas, the
Court's decision in Dawson creates a "double standard." It allows the
defendant to highlight attractive aspects of his character, while denying the state the opportunity to highlight less attractive ones.
Mercy supplies a way around the double standard. Evidence of a
defendant's character-good or bad-should play no role in determining what punishment he deserves. If the only purpose of the penalty phase is to impose deserved punishment, then character evidence
should be excluded entirely. Assuming that the only "issue being
tried" 59 during the penalty phase is what punishment the defendant
deserves, the majority in Dawsonwas right. Evidence of bad character
is irrelevant to that inquiry. What the majority failed to see, however,
was that evidence of good character is also irrelevant. On the other
hand, if the "issue being tried" during the penalty phase extends to
mercy, then character evidence may indeed be relevant. A capital sentencingjury can rely on character evidence to help it decide whether
mercy should be granted or withheld. 160 From this perspective, evidence of good character, together with evidence of bad character,
may be admitted during the penalty phase, but only if both are allocated to the domain of mercy.
3.

Future Dangerousness

Retributivism has a distinct temporal orientation. 16 1 It looks
backward. This simple point has important consequences if the basic
goal of the penalty phase is to impose deserved punishment. From a
158
Cf Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (upholding constitutionality of "hate
crime" ordinance). For commentary on the constitutional legitimacy of measuring punishment based on motivation in general and bias motivation in particular, compare Frederick

M. Lawrence, Resolving the Hate Crimes/HateSpeech Paradox: PunishingBias Crimes and Protecting Racist Speech, 68 NOTRE DAME L. Rn-V. 673 (1993) with Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones
Can Put You inJail, but Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutionaland Policy Dilemmas of
Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L. REv.333 (1991). On the role of motivation in the
criminal law generally, see Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role
of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635; Douglas N. Husak,
Motive and CriminalLiability, CrM.JusT. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1989, at 3.
159 See, e.g., Dawson, 503 U.S. at 168.
160
Cf Dressier, Excusing Wrongdoers, supra note 9, at 699 ("[M]itigating a convicted
defendant's punishment because of that person's exemplary character or for any other
reason of compassion, is not a function of justice but of mercy, an independent moral
virtue.").
161 See, e.g., KLEINIG, supranote 92, at 61; GEORGE SHER, DESERT 5 (1987); VON HIRSCH,
DOINGJusTICE, supra note 89, at 46 ("[T]o assert that someone deserves to be punished is

to look to his past wrongdoing as reason for having him penalized.");Joel Feinberg, Justice
and PersonalDeser4 in NOMOS VI: JUSTIcE 69, 72 (Carl J. Friedrich & John W. Chapman
eds., 1963); Ernest van den Haag, Why CapitalPunishment , 54ALB.L. Ray. 501, 503 (1990)
("[W]e punish for actual past behavior, not possible future behavior.").
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retributive perspective, the punishment a defendant deserves is, to put
it somewhat metaphorically, fully congealed at the time of the crime.
The future is neither here nor there. 162 Only the past matters.
In fact, however, the penalty phase departs dramatically from retributivism's command never to look forward. The Court has held
that capital sentences can legitimately be based on predictions about
the defendant's "future dangerousness." 16 3 A handful of states make
predictions of future dangerousness a statutory aggravating circumstance,' 64 while others make such predictions admissible as a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance. 165 Moreover, according to one
recent study, capital juries tend to discuss future dangerousness more
than anything else, including the defendant's background, his upbringing, his IQ and intelligence, or any remorse he feels.' 66 Fear of
162
See, e.g., Howe, supra note 27, at 397 ("If the capital sentencing inquiry exists only to
assess the offender's culpability, consideration of utilitarian issues would be improper.").
163
See, e.g., Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2637 (1994) ("Both a backwardlooking and a forward-looking inquiry are a permissible part of the sentencing process
....
").The Court has, however, expressed some reluctance to embrace incapacitation as a
free-standing justification for a death sentence. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 46162 (1984) ("Although incapacitation has never been embraced as a sufficient justification
for the death penalty, it is a legitimate consideration in a capital sentencing proceeding.");
cf Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1038 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In capital
sentencing decisions, ... incapacitation is largely irrelevant, at least when the alternative of
life imprisonment without possibility of parole is available. ..."); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 183 n.28 (1976) (describing incapacitation as simply "another purpose [of punishment] that has been discussed"). One interpretation of the Court's statement that "incapacitation has never been embraced as a sufficient justification for the death penalty" is
that future dangerousness cannot, by itself, make a defendant death-eligible. See Gillers,
supra note 38, at 1096.
164 See Acker & Lanier, supra note 66, at 118 (noting that in six states-Idaho,
Oklahoma, Wyoming, Texas, Oregon, and Virginia-future dangerousness is a statutory
aggravating circumstance). The Court has also allowed the state to instruct the jury on the
authority of the governor to reduce a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of
parole to one with the possibility of parole. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1003
(1983). But see People v. Ramos, 689 P.2d 430, 441 (Cal. 1984) (rejecting Ramos on state
constitutional grounds); State v. Jones, 639 So.2d 1144, 1155 (La. 1994) (same).
165
Cf People v. Danielson, 838 P.2d 729, 745-46 (Cal. 1992) (expert testimony on
future dangerousness not permitted, but prosecutor may argue defendant is dangerous);
State v. Ward, 449 S.E.2d 709, 740 (N.C. 1994) (holding that "specific deterrent" arguments are not improper).
166 See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in
CapitalCases, 79 CORNELL L. Rxv. 1, 6 (1993) ("Other than facts about the crime, questions
related to the defendant's dangerousness if ever back in society are the issues jurors discuss
most."); id. at 4 ("Our data confirm that jurors' deliberations emphasize dangerousness
and that misguided fears of early release generate death sentences."); see also Sally Costanzo & Mark Costanzo, Life or Death Decisions: An Analysis of CapitalJury Decision Making
Under the Special Issues Sentencing Framework, 18 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 151, 160 (1994); Lawrence T. White, JurorDecision Making in the CapitalPenalty Trial: An Analysis of Crime and
Defense Strategies, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 113, 113 (1987) ("[N]early all jurors also offered the
observation that the penalty phase decision hinged on the issue whether the defendant
would pose a continuing threat to society.").

19961

MERCY IN CAPTIAL SENTENCING

1031

what a defendant might do in the future overshadows all else and
works as a powerful advocate on the side of death.
Assuming incapacitation is a legitimate justification for punishment, a capital offender could of course be incapacitated through life
imprisonment, which would probably cost less than it now takes to
litigate the average capital case to execution. In any event, relying on
death to incapacitate would still only be warranted if a defendant did
indeed present some appreciable risk of future danger. Reasonable
minds will disagree over how great that risk must be. For those convinced that death-eligible defendants already deserve death, any future risk, no matter how slight, will usually be enough to dispel any
lingering doubt and tip the scale in death's favor. For those not already convinced, however, the risk must be more substantial. Unfortunately, our power to predict future dangerousness seems on a par
with our power to predict next month's weather. Study after study
shows that long-term predictions of future dangerousness are more
167
often wrong than right.
The Court faced this problem in Barefoot v. Estelle.' 68 Thomas
Barefoot was condemned largely on the strength of testimony from a
psychologist named James Grigson, who the state of Texas routinely
called upon to testify at capital sentencing hearings. 169 Dr. Grigson,
The Court has recently held that a capital defendant has a Due Process right to inform
the jury that he would not be eligible for parole if sentenced to prison. Simmons v. South
Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994). For commentary on this question, see, e.g.,J. Mark Lane,
"Is There Life Without Parole?" A CapitalDefendant's Right to a Meaningful Alternative Sentence,
26 Loy. LA L. RL,. 327, 334 (1993); Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, Deathly
Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REV. 211, 211 (1987); William W. Hood, III, Note, The Meaning of "Life"for
Virginia Jurors and Its Effect on Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 75 VA. L. REv. 1605, 1605
(1989).
167
See generallyJAMsS W. MARQUART Ex At-, THE ROPE, THE CHAIR, AND THE NEEDLE:
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS, 1923-1990, at 179 (1994) ("Overprediction dominates.");
NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 70-73 (1974) (discussing problem of overprediction of future dangerousness); RichardJ. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of
Mental Health Professionalsin the CriminalProcess: The Casefor Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L.
REv. 427, 443 n.39 (1980);JosephJ. Cocozza & HenryJ. Steadman, TheFailureof Psychiatric
Predictionsof Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 1084, 10981101 (1976) (reexamining the inability of psychiatrists to predict future dangerousness);
George E. Dix, Expert PredictionTestimony in CapitalSentencing: Evidentiaryand Constitutional
Considerations, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1 (1981) (discussing the inaccuracies of psychiatric
predictions); Charles P. Ewing, Preventive Detention and Execution: The Constitutionality of
PunishingFuture Crimes, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 139 (1991) (collecting data); Christopher
Slobogin, Dangerousnessand Expertis4 133 U. PA. L. REv. 97, 110-11 n.50 (1984) (studying
the rate of false-positives).
168 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
169
See, e.g., MARQUART ET AL., supra note 167, at 176 (noting that Dr. Grigson has

"testified for the prosecution in nearly one-third of the Texas cases involving death row
inmates"); Charles P. Ewing, "Dr.Death" and the Case for an Ethical Ban on Psychiatric and
Psychological Predictionsof FutureDangerousness in CapitalSentencing Proceedings,8 AM. J.L. &
MED. 407, 410 (1983); Shelley Clarke, Note, A Reasoned Moral Response: Rethinking Texas's
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known as "Dr. Death," would just as routinely find that the defendant
"constitute[d] a continuing threat to society." 170 At Barefoot's trial,
Dr. Grigson found a "one hundred percent... chance" that Thomas
Barefoot would kill again, unless he was executed. The doctor may
have been right, but he was probably wrong. Speaking as amicus curiae, the American Psychiatric Association informed the Court that
professional predictions of future dangerousness are wrong at least
17
two out of three times. '
Nonetheless, the Court was in a decidedly deregulatory mood
when it decided Barefoot.172 It was unprepared to say that incapacitation was an unconstitutional basis for a death sentence, or that predictions of future dangerousness should be disallowed because they were
too speculative. 173 Such predictions, the Court explained, were common in other departments of the law, such as civil commitment, bail,
and parole hearings, during which laymen and professionals alike regularly speculate about a defendant's future behavior. These practices
had long withstood constitutional scrutiny. 174 Moreover, the Court
explained that even if psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness
were usually wrong, the defendant's own experts could attest to that
fact,' 75 and the jury could be relied upon to sort it all out.
The Court ignored a number of things in Barefoot. It did not, for
example, dwell on the fact that a bad guess during the penalty phase
of a capital trial commonly entails more serious consequences than a
bad guess during a bail or parole hearing. 17 6 Nor did the Court worry
that jurors who have already convicted a defendant of capital murder
would, in all likelihood, be predisposed to accept the state's suggestion that execution is the only way to prevent the defendant from
committing more violence in the future.' 7 7 Nor, finally, did the Court
stop to think that a damning prediction of future violence coming
from an expert psychiatrist or psychologist might well encourage juCapital Sentencing Statute After Penry v. Lynaugh, 69 TEX. L REv. 407, 447-48 & n.188

(1990). At latest report, Dr. Grigson seems to be out of business. See Bruce Vincent, Dr.
Death'sDemise? ProsecutorsShun Death Penalty Expert, LEGAL TIMEs, Jan. 1, 1996, at 4, 8.

170 Barefoot 463 U.S. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted).
171 See Amicus Brief for the American Psychiatric Association at 9, Barefoot v. Estelle,
463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080).
172 See, e.g., Weisberg, supra note 16, at 343.
173 See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Disorderin the Court: The DeathPenalty and the Constitution, 85
MicH. L. Ray. 1741 (1987); William S. Geimer, Death At Any Cost: A Critique of the Supreme
Court's Recent Retreatfrom Its Death Penalty Standards, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. Rav. 737 (1985);
Special Project, CapitalPunishmentin 1984: Abandoningthe Pursuitof Fairnessand Consistency,
69 CoRu.L. Ray. 1129 (1984); Weisberg, supra note 16.
174 463 U.S. at 898.
175 Id. at 901.
176 See, e.g., Gillers, supra note 38, at 1098.
177 Cf Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 166 at 6 ("Jurors usually conclude that the defendant will be dangerous.").
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rors to defer to the expert's professional authority, thereby sidestepping the hard moral questions involved in capital sentencing.178
Future dangerousness would play a very different role in a reconstructed penalty phase. From a retributive perspective, we cannot
justly punish someone for what he might do in the future. Whether
the future is calm or turbulent has nothing to do with the punishment
a defendant deserves for a crime already committed. Consequently,
evidence of future dangerousness, as well as evidence of future
nondangerousness, 7 9 would play no role at the desert phase. Only if
the jury finds the defendant deserves death would the state be allowed
to rely on evidence of future dangerousness to resist the defendant's
plea for mercy. Likewise, the defendant would be free to rely on evidence of nondangerousness to support his plea. As with unforeseeable harm and character evidence, future dangerousness would play a
role in capital sentencing, but only insofar as it informs a grant of
mercy.
The foregoing analysis is not meant to be exhaustive. On the
contrary, victim impact evidence, character evidence, and evidence of
future dangerousness represent only a small part of the rich universe
of evidence now admitted during the penalty phase of a capital trial.
Fully delineating the boundary between the sphere of justice and the
sphere of mercy-would require examining other elements of that universe. We would need to examine, among other things, the proper
role for prior criminal convictions, expressions of remorse, a co-defendant's sentence, the victim's status (say, as a police officer or child),
and the defendant's motive (say, pecuniary gain or racial hatred).180
Hopefully, however, the forgoing analysis conveys a rough sense of
how the conceptual distinction between moral desert and mercy
might work in the real world.

178 See, e.g., Claudia M. Worrell, PsychiatricPrediction ofDangerousness in CapitalSentencing: The Questfor InnocentAuthority, 5 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L 433, 439 (1987).
179 See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 16 (1986); see also Michael L. Radelet &

James W. Marquart, Assessing NondangerousnessDuringPenaltyPhases of CapitalTrials,54 ALB.
L. REV. 845, 845 (1990) (arguing that many death sentences are based on unjustified predictions of future criminality).
180 Nigel Walker lists the following as primafade candidates for the status of mercybased reason:
[1] reducing the "just" sentence because the offender has served what
seems an excessive sentence for an earlier offense; [2] reducing the just
sentence because an equally guilty accomplice has been sentenced more
leniently in error; [3] reducing thejust sentence as a reward for meritorious conduct unrelated to the offense; [4] reducing the just sentence in
response to a plea from the victim's relatives .. . ; [5] reducing the just
sentence because of the offender's subsequent remorse.
See Walker, supra note 9, at 34 (citations omitted).
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III
ZN.FA VOREM CL EANIAE

As a virtue, mercy may seem like it needs no defense. In fact,
however, several objections may be lodged against a proposal to incorporate mercy into the penalty phase. These objections are twofold.
The first claims that restructuring the penalty phase to accommodate
mercy is unnecessary because mercy-based evidence is now admitted
during the penalty phase, and juries may, if they wish, return a life
sentence based on that evidence. The second claims simply that restructuring the penalty phase to accommodate mercy would, for a variety of reasons, be unwise.
A. An Unnecessary Virtue?
The first objection holds that the proposed reform of the penalty
phase is unnecessary. The jury already hears evidence during the
death-selection stage that, according to the analysis offered above, relates to the question of mercy. If the jury wishes to impose a life sentence on the basis of that evidence in the name of mercy, nothing
stops it from doing so. Separating the two inquiries may be conceptually more elegant, but for all practical purposes it gains us nothing.
This objection overlooks at least two consequences arising from a
failure to separate the questions of deserved punishment and mercy.
The first is symbolic. The substantive criminal law makes a distinction
between justification and excuse,' 8 ' and this distinction marks an important moral difference. A criminal defendant acquitted because he
presents a valid justification, such as self-defense, has committed no
moral wrong. What he did was morally correct, or at least permissible.
In contrast, a criminal defendant acquitted because he presents a
valid excuse is still guilty of wrongdoing. He is excused because he
could not help himself' 8 2 Similarly, a capital defendant who receives
a life sentence because he deserves that sentence receives what justice
requires. No more, and no less. A defendant who receives a life sentence through a grant of mercy, however, has cause for humility and
181

See George P. Fletcher, The Psychotic Aggressor-A Generation Later, 27 ISR. L. REv.

227, 245 (1993) (suggesting bifurcation between the liability and the excuse stage of criminal trial to ensure that the public understands the meaning of verdict); see also Dressier,
supra note 135, at 1169 (discussing the distinction between excuse and justification);
Dressier, Excusing Wrongdoers, supra note 9, at 689 (discussing the need to separate feelings
of compassion from the decision to excuse). On law's expressive fraction, see generally
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021 (1996).
182
See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 135, at 290; see also Watson, supra note 140, at 260
("In general, an excuse shows that one was not to blame, whereas ajustification shows that
one was not to blame."). See generally Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders ofJustification
and Excuse 84 COLUM. L. RExv. 1897 (1984).
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thanks, for his sentence is less than his moral guilt warranted. The law
should express this distinction.
The second consequence is more important, because it relates to
the basic retributive goal of reducing the risk of false-positive moral
error. Quite simply, the existing structure of the penalty phase creates
an unnecessary risk that death will be imposed on defendants who do
not deserve it. As things now stand, the penalty phase obscures the
distinction between deserved punishment and mercy and creates a
dangerous mix of mercy-based evidence and desert-based evidence.
Some capital defendants are wrongly condemned on the basis of evidence whose only legitimate purpose is to suppress the inclination to
show mercy (i.e., mercy-aggravating evidence).
Consider the following scenario. The defendant, a young man of
twenty, already has a lifetime of despair. He was weaned on violence,
fear, abuse, and deprivation at the hands of a sadistic father and alcoholic mother. For escape, the defendant turns to alcohol, drugs, and
a life of petty crime, which finally culminates in an armed robbery.
No one is harmed. The defendant pleads guilty to a lesser offense,
spends a short time in prison, and is released on parole. Upon release, the cycle begins again. This time it ends in a convenience store
with the defendant pointing a gun. The clerk at the counter, a young
woman in her teens, is startled and panics. Her panic feeds the defendant's. The defendant shoots, and the young woman lies dead. The
defendant flees, but not before taking money from the cash register.
Because he killed the young woman, and robbed the store, the
defendant's crime is a capital offense. A murder committed in the
"course of another felony"18 3 is an aggravating circumstance in every
state. 18 4 Thejury accordingly finds the defendant death-eligible. During the penalty phase, the jury learns that the young woman was the
oldest of three siblings. Her father was a teacher at the local high
school; her mother a dental hygienist. The family is devoutly religious, and the young woman sang in the church choir every Sunday.
She was a senior in high school, and getting ready to start college.
She planned to become a doctor. Each member of her family takes
the stand during the penalty phase and relates, in vivid detail, the
183
Committing murder during the course of another felony is a widely applicable aggravating circumstance. See, e.g., Acker & Lanier, supra note 66, at 121 (noting that "[a]ll
death penaltyjurisdictions make the commission of a contemporaneous felony relevant to
whether a murder is punishable by death" and that this aggravator applies to some 75-80%
of all murders in some jurisdictions); see also Tina Rosenberg, Deadliest D.A., N.Y. TMES
MAC., July 16, 1995, at 21, 25 (noting that felony aggravator was the "most common" aggravator charged in Philadelphia). At a speech given at Cornell Law School on April 17,
1995, the attorney general of NewYork, Dennis Vacco, characterized NewYork's version of
this aggravating circumstance as a "catch-all." Dennis Vacco, Speech at Cornell Law School
(Apr. 17, 1995).
184
See Acker & Lanier, supranote 66, at 121.
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emptiness they now feel. Their lives and dreams are shattered; justice
is all they want.
The defense paints an equally vivid portrait of the defendant's
life. 185 Thejury hears about the years of abuse and neglect, about the
beatings, and about the days on end without anything to eat. Thejury
hears how the defendant was shuffled from one relative to the next,
because his parents didn't want him. The jury hears about the first
time the defendant sniffed glue; how this escalated to beer, then wine,
then marijuana, and then crack. The jury hears about the night of the
crime. It started out as each day did, with a can of beer. Joined by
some friends, the defendant continued drinking throughout the day.
Then, the beer ran out. The money had run out long before. It was
late, and the convenience store was isolated on the outskirts of town.
It would be an easyjob. No one would know; no one would get hurt.
The defendant didn't anticipate the woman's panic. The defense
notes that the autopsy report showed the gunshot killed the woman
instantly.
The jury also hears from the police, the state's psychiatrist, and
the state's custodian of records. The police describe the scene of the
crime, and they spare no detail. Enlarged color photographs of the
crime scene, which were already displayed to the jury during the guilt
phase, are passed around once more. The state psychiatrist takes the
stand. Based on his ten years of experience, his review of the defendant's criminal history, and a one-hour interview with the defendant,
he confidently claims the defendant is a "continuing threat to society."
The psychiatrist's prediction, which he sticks to despite aggressive
cross-examination, is buttressed when the custodian of records takes
the stand and describes the circumstances surrounding the defendant's prior conviction for robbery. The jury learns that if the defendant is sentenced to life imprisonment, he will be eligible for parole
in twenty years. The verdict is death.
If we acknowledge the distinction between deserved punishment
and mercy, any confidence we have in the jury's verdict should be
shaken. The victim impact evidence and the testimony concerning
the defendant's future dangerousness, both of which exercise a strong
influence on juries,1 8 6 cannot legitimately help the jury decide what
punishment the defendant deserves. Neither piece of evidence
185
This assumes that capital defendants receive adequate legal representation. Often
they do not. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counselfor the Poor The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime butfor the Worst Lawyer, 103 YA aE LJ. 1835 (1994) (examining the pervasiveness

of deficient representation for the accused in capital cases); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse
Justice: UnderfundedIndigentDefense Services and ArbitraryDeath Sentences, 43 BuFF. L Rxv. 329
(1995) (concluding that lack of funding for capital defense services leads to arbitrary imposition of the death penalty).
186 Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 166, at 5-6.
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should have been permitted to enter the jury's moral calculus on that
question. Permitting the jury to consider this evidence unnecessarily
increased the risk of the defendant being wrongly condemned. If
these facts are to play any part in capital sentencing, they should be
limited to the question of mercy and cabined within the mercy phase.
As discussed above, the most straightforward way to reconstruct
the penalty phase in order to accommodate mercy would be to actually bifurcate it, so that capital trials would have three separate stages:
guilt, desert, and mercy. Within such a system, jurors could decide
the question of deserved punishment apart from the question of
mercy and without one influencing the other. Jurors electing to show
mercy could do so, for example, without leaving the misimpression
that the deserved punishment was life imprisonment.
This newly-trifurcated penalty phase would, however, further
complicate an already complex process. It might also encourage unwelcome strategic behavior. Capital jurors deliberating on the defendant's fate during the desert phase and wanting to condemn the
defendant's actions in the strongest way possible might, even though
they believe the defendant deserves life imprisonment, nonetheless
impose a death sentence. They could then grant mercy during the
upcoming mercy stage, leaving the defendant with the punishmentlife imprisonment-he should have gotten in the first place, albeit he
now receives it under the guise of "mercy." This strategy, however,
sends the wrong moral signals and might even backfire. In the worst
case, ajury exposed to powerful mercy-aggravating evidence might decide, despite its original plan to grant mercy, to withhold it. The net
result: an undeserving defendant condemned to death.
Even if the penalty phase is not bifurcated and the existing, single-stage structure is retained, the defendant sh6uld, at the very least,
have the option of seeking mercy. If he takes it, then both mercybased and desert-based evidence would be introduced together, as
they now are. Under the reformed system, however, the jury would be
explicitly instructed that it must decide on both deserved punishment
and mercy, relying on different evidence for each inquiry. Whether a
jury could keep these two inquiries separate is, of course, open to
doubt. 187 On the other hand, if the defendant decides not to seek
mercy, then the only question for the jury would be what punishment
is deserved. Mercy-aggravating evidence would accordingly be ex187 Ample room exists to question how well capital juries understand and follow the
instructions they receive during the penalty phase. See, e.g., WilliamJ. Bowers, The Capital
Jury Project:Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. LJ. 1043 (1995); James
Luginbuhl &Julie Howe, Discretionin CapitalSentencingInstructions:Guided or Misguided, 70
IND. L.J. 1161 (1995); Jordan M. Steiker, The Limits of Legal Language: Decisionmaking in
Capital Cases, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2590 (1996); Peter Meijes Tiersma, Dictomies and Death: Do
CapitalJurorsUnderstandMitigation, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 1.
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cluded, so the defendant would face no risk of a death sentence based
on the suffering of the victim's family or on the jury's prediction
about his future dangerousness. By the same token, however, mercymitigating evidence would also be excluded, so the defendant would
lose the chance of an undeserved life sentence based on some redeeming aspect of his character. How to proceed would be the defen88
dant's choice.
B. An Unwise Virtue?
The second objection assumes that even if mercy could somehow
be successfully integrated into the penalty phase, it would nonetheless
be unwise to do so. Some specific objections of this sort are addressed
below.
1.

The Injustice of Mercy

When we decide to grant mercy, however we ultimately arrive at
that decision, we impose less punishment than justice requires. As
such, an act of mercy looks like an act of injustice, because "[i] f mercy
requires a tempering of justice, then there is a sense in which mercy
may require a departure fromjustice."' 8 9 If so, mercy is a virtue whose
exercise produces injustice, which makes it an odd virtue indeed.
Philosophers have struggled to resolve this puzzle. Some argue
thatjustice requires simply adhering to a rule, and that mercy requires
individuation. 190 This solves the puzzle, but distorts the requirements
of justice. Justice, as well as mercy, requires individuation. Others
suggest that mercy merely requires selecting the lesser of two punishments, either of which is deserved, so that the exercise of mercy produces no injustice. 191 This solves the puzzle, but only because justice
sets a range of deserved punishments rather than identifying a
uniquely deserved punishment. Still others suggest that mercy entails
no injustice where no antecedent obligation to do justice exists. However, since judges and juries are presumably obligated to do justice, it
would be unjust for them to show mercy. On this view, therefore,
mercy's puzzle can be solved, but only if the power to grant mercy is
188

This Article does not examine the constitutionalstatus of mercy. It does not ask, in

other words, whether or not the states are constitutionally required to afford capital defendants the possibility of receiving mercy in the penalty phase. Although it seems unlikely
that the Constitution imposes any such obligation on the states, a capital defendant may be
constitutionally entitled to exclude mercy-aggravating evidence from the penalty phase inasmuch as this evidence creates an unnecessary risk that an undeserving defendant will be
wrongly condemned. This risk is arguably inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment's emphasis on heightened reliability in capital sentencing. Of course, if the defendant excludes
mercy-aggravating evidence, the state should be free to exclude mercy-mitigating evidence.
189 Murphy, Mercy and Legaljustice, supra note 9, at 167.
190 See id. at 169-74.
191 See Hestevold, supra note 9, at 361.

19961

1]MERCY IN CAPTIAL SENTENCNG

1039

vested exclusively with the victim. Mercy could come only from the
92
victim, not from the state.'
To address this problem fairly would take us far afield, without
any confidence that the journey would end in success.' 9 3 Still, even if
it turned out that mercy and justice cannot be reconciled, such that
capital sentencing juries must, for the sake of justice, be denied the
power to grant mercy, then we would at least have improved the quality ofjustice. Capitaljurors would no longer impose death sentences
based on mercy-aggravating evidence, and capital defendants would
no longer risk being wrongly condemned based on that evidence.
2.

Arbitrarinessand Discrimination

The mercy phase, like the desert phase, relies on an individualized mode of decisionmaking. In deciding whether to grant mercy,
the potential mercy-giver must examine any and all facts bearing on
the question of mercy. Discretion is needed to decide not only what
punishment the defendant deserves, but also whether to grant mercy.
At this point, one might object that incorporating mercy into the penalty phase would give capital sentencing juries more discretion than
they already have. And, the argument continues, we should avoid this
if possible, because with discretion comes arbitrariness and discrimination. One might further object that any effort to "expand" a capital
jury's discretion in order to make room for mercy is at odds with
1 94
Furman's demand for even-handedness in capital sentencing.
Take first the problem of arbitrariness. Furman has done little to
improve consistency in capital sentencing. A capital jury must find
the existence of one, nonvague aggravating circumstance. Otherwise,
it is pretty much free to decide as it sees fit. Consequently, incorporating mercy into the penalty phase would not really "expand" the jury's
192 Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, supra note 9, at 174-77; see also Twambley, supra
note 9, at 85 ("[A] judge has no right to be merciful."). Murphy ultimately modifies his
position, concluding that:
Since individuals may legitimately show mercy in waiving their rights, a
judge or any other official may exercise mercy in a criminal case if(and this
is a very big "if") it can be shown that such an official is acting, not merely
on his own sentiments, but as a vehicle for expressing the sentiments of all
those who have been victimized by the criminal and who, given those sentiments, wish to waive the right that each has that the criminal be punished.
Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, supra note 9, at 179-80.
193 Some journeys the unequipped should not take. Cf Brian Leiter, Intellectual Voyeurism in Legal Scholarship, 4 YALEJ.L. & HuMAN. 79, 80 (1992) (examining when "the promising scholarly endeavor of interdisciplinary research becomes a forum for posturing and the
misuse of knowledge.").
194 See, e.g., Howe, supra note 27, at 855 ("[A]rbitrary influences appear to run rampant where the inquiry extends to judging the offender's general deserts."); Sundby, supra
note 23, at 1199 ("If Lockett was extended to require constitutionally that a trump card of
mercy be given the sentencer, [Furmanand Woodson-Lockett] would become even more difficult to reconcile.").
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discretion, nor would it "exacerbate" the problem of arbitrariness. Instead, it would simply restructure how the jury exercises the discretion
it already possesses. Whether or not the existing pattern of capital
sentences is intolerably arbitrary, reconfiguring the penalty phase to
accommodate mercy would not make things any worse. If we want
greater consistency in capital sentencing, we should narrow the deatheligible class, not deny the jury the power to grant mercy.
Moreover, even ifjuries grant mercy "arbitrarily," we still need to
ask why this is a problem. Incorporating mercy into the penalty phase
would no doubt mean some defendants will receive mercy, while
other defendants who seem like equally worthy candidates will not.
Grants of mercy might have no more logic than the flip of a coin.
Such arbitrary grants of mercy might appear to violate Furman's antiarbitrariness injunction. Yet, insofar as no one is entitled to mercy,
those who do not receive it have no standing injustice to complain. 195
Whatever force Furman's injunction does or should have in the domain ofjustice and deserved punishment, its writ does not run to the
domain of mercy.
Consider next the problem of discrimination. It is difficult to exaggerate the influence of race in the administration of the death penalty.' 9 6 If ajury has intentionally based its death-selection decision on
a morally invidious fact, such as race, and the defendant can prove
this intent, the law provides a remedy.' 97 All too often, however, no
outward sign betrays the invidious intent. Discrimination is frequently
invisible, either because jurors are appropriately circumspect, or because they themselves are unaware of its influence over them. 198 Yet
195 Mercy is perhaps best understood as an "imperfect virtue." See Rainbolt, supranote
9, at 172. In this view, the "principle of equal treatment" simply does not apply to mercy.
Id.; cf.Davis, supra note 57, at 114 ("If there is a basis for rejecting 'clemency by chance,'
the basis is, it seems, envy."). However, other moral restrictions do apply to the exercise of
mercy. So, for example, it would be unacceptable to extend mercy to one defendant because he is white or to withhold it from another because he is African-American. See infra
notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
196 See BALDus ET AL., supra note 68; WILLIAM J. BowERs ET AL., LEGAL HOMICIDE:
DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982 (1984); SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO,
DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989); Anthony
G. Amsterdam, Race and the Death Penalty, CriM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1988, at 2;
Margaret Vandiver, The Quality of Mercy: Race and Clemency in FloridaDeath Penalty Cases,
1924-1966, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 315 (1993).
197
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (noting that intentional discrimi-

nation violates equal protection).
198 See, e.g., Sheri L.Johnson, UnconsciousRacism and the CriminalLaw, 73 CoRN.EL L
REV. 1016 (1988); Charles R. Lawrence Il, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with UnconsciousRacism, 39 STAN.L. Rxv. 317 (1987); cf.Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v.
Kemp: Race, CapitalPunishment,and the Supreme Court; 101 HAtv. L Ray. 1388, 1405 (1988)
("[T]he doctrine of purposeful discrimination insulates entirely many of the unconscious
ways in which prejudiced social values give rise to differential treatment on the basis of
race.").
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even when no outward signs reveal the influence of invidious factors,
we can still detect their presence. Looking at the capital sentencing
system through statistical analysis has demonstrated the powerful effect of these otherwise invisible determinants of death. The most
studied of these is, of course, race.' 9 9 Statistics confirm what our experience has taught: Race plays a continuing role in deciding who is
20 0
sentenced to death.
One vehicle driving these discriminatory patterns is the jury's
broad sentencing discretion. Insofar as mercy is thought to "expand"
the jury's discretion, it might also be thought to expand the jury's
opportunity to discriminate. 20 1 Again, this objection mistakenly assumes that incorporating mercy into the penalty phase would create
new avenues down which discrimination could travel. In fact, the
main consequence of incorporating mercy would simply be to divide
the death-selection decision into two separate moments and to reconfigure the discretion the jury already has. On the other hand, if it
turns out that jurors exercise the power to grant mercy in a discriminatory fashion and no way exists to ameliorate this discrimination,
then the power to grant mercy should be withheld. Arbitrary grants of
20 2
mercy are morally tolerable; discriminatory ones are not.

3.

Reason and Emotion

A third objection to incorporating mercy into the structure of the
penalty phase is rooted in the traditional dichotomy between reason
and emotion. Law is often understood to make its metaphorical
home within the realm of reason. The nature of law, or perhaps its
199
Another invisible determinant is the location of the crime. Crimes committed in
rural areas are more likely to be prosecuted as capital crimes than are crimes committed in
urban areas. See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74J. CrM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754 (1983).
200 However, the Court held in McCleskey v. Kemp that the Constitution does not reach
or remedy this hidden wrong. Only intentional discrimination is within its purview. See
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291-99, 308-13.
201
See, e.g., Howe, supra note 27, at 355 ("[Airbitrary influences appear to run rampant where the inquiry extends to judging the offender's general deserts.").
202
Cf Gary Watson, Closing the Gap, 37 ARIZ. L. REX. 135, 140 ("If all of the prisoners
on death row deserved the maximum sentence, it would still be injustice to the black prisoners
to punish the white prisoners less."). Some commentators disagree with this view. For
example, Ernest van den Haag writes:
If we grant that some (even all) murderers of blacks, or, some (even all)
white and rich murderers, escape the death penalty, how does that reduce
the guilt of murderers of whites, or of black and poor murderers, so that
they should be spared execution too? Guilt is personal. No murderer becomes less guilty, or less deserving of punishment, because another murderer was punished leniently, or escaped punishment altogether.
van den Haag, supranote 63, at 173-74.
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aspiration, is commonly associated with ideas of rationality, predict20 3
ability, and consistency.
Indeed, this vision inspired Furman. It is, as the Court observed
in Gardnerv. Florida,20 4 of "vital importance to the defendant and the
community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and
'20 5
appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.
This same theme appeared in Californiav. Brown2 0 6 where the defendant complained that an instruction telling jurors not to be swayed by
"mere... sympathy" would cause some of them to ignore mitigating
evidence. Emphasizing that the instruction prohibited "mere" sympathy, a plurality of the Court rejected Brown's claim. A reasonable juror, the plurality explained, would "interpret the phrase as an
admonition to ignore emotional responses that are not rooted in the
aggravating and mitigating evidence introduced during the penalty
207
phase."
In contrast to the rational vision of law animating Furman, we
commonly associate mercy with emotion and even caprice. Consequently, one might think that telling jurors they can dispense mercy
would "inject emotion into the deliberative process."2 08 Measured
against Furman's vision of law, mercy is an emotional, unpredictable,
and unwelcome presence. This dichotomy between reason and emotion, together with mercy's association with capriciousness, exercises a
powerful influence on the legal imagination and may seem to preclude a place for mercy in the penalty phase.
The links in the chain of reasoning leading from emotion to lawlessness are, however, too weak to sustain the objection. To begin
with, the penalty phase would hardly be free from emotion even if its
only goal was to impose just and deserved punishment. Nor would it
would be flooded with emotion if it incorporated mercy. The idea
that ajury's inquiry into the defendant's moral desert is an act of reason untouched by emotion, while its decision to grant or withhold
mercy is an act of emotion unmediated by reason, is untrue. Why
203
Cf. Paul Gewirtz, Commentary, Aeschylus'Law, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1043, 1049 (1988)
("In our time ... advocates for reason's preeminent role in law remain ascendant virtually
everywhere.... ."); Paul Gewirtz, Essay, On "IKnowIt When ISee It, "105 YALE LJ. 1023, 1029
(1996) ("All too often judges and scholars who write about law assert an inappropriately

sharp distinction between the rational and the nonrational, especially between reason and
emotion . . . ."); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574 (1987)
(arguing that the law ought to incorporate empathy); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal

Storytellin& and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2099 (1989)
(rejecting the idea that law and empathy are mutually exclusive).
204 480 U.S. 349 (1977) (plurality opinion).
205 Id. at 358.
206 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
207
208

Id. at 542.

Chambers v. State, 650 A.2d 727, 731 (Md. 1994) (noncapital trial).
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should a grant of mercy be attended with any more emotion than a
decision to impose deserved punishment? On the contrary, no decision made during the penalty phase can be totally insulated from
emotion.
More to the point, the dichotomy between reason and emotion,
though alluring, is also misleading. Emotions can indeed be powerful, and sometimes their power can overwhelm or "unhinge" our
faculty of reason.2 0 9 Yet our emotions are not irrational. They are, at
least in part, rational and cognitive.2 1 0 Emotions do not strike randomly. When we experience an emotion we generally do so for a reason. 21 1 Moreover, emotions can be a "heuristic guide to finding out
what is morally right."2 1 2 When, among other things, they are "intelligently proportionate in intensity to their objects," they act as "trustworthy guides to moral insight."2 13 The experience of pity, for
example, depends on the belief that the person pitied is someone who
has suffered undeserved misfortune. 21 4 Emotions cannot be written
off as irrational, and neither can mercy.
4. Juy Nullification
A fourth objection to incorporating mercy into the penalty phase
analogizes an act of mercy to an act of jury nullification. The operation of so-called "quasi-mandatory" sentencing statutes best illustrates
this objection.
209 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 16, at 190 (noting "picture ... in which the retributivist
emotions unhinge our reason by their power").
210 See, e.g., RONALD DE SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTION 141-70 (1987) (explaining how both rationality and objectivity could apply to emotions);

JusTIN

OAKLEv, MORAL-

rrY AND THE EMOTIONS 34 (1992) (concluding that emotions are "complexes of cognitions,
desires, and affects together"); Calhoun, supranote 9, at 84 ("No emotion is simply a feeling."); John Deigh, Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions, 104 ETHICS 824, 824 (1994)
("Cognitivism now dominates the philosophical study of emotions."); Nussbaum, supra
note 9, at 121 (noting that "contrast between morality and sympathy is a nest of confusions"); id. at 121 n.91 (noting that "merciful sentiments are based on judgments that are
(if the deliberative process is well executed) both true and justified by the evidence");
Martha C. Nussbaum, The Use and Abuse of Philosophy in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REv.
1627, 1634 (1993) ("There is a remarkable degree of consensus, in recent philosophical
work-and in anthropological and psychological work as well-that emotions are notjust
mindless pushes and pulls, but forms of perception or thought, highly responsive to beliefs
about the world and changes in beliefs.") (footnotes omitted); Pillsbury, supranote 14, at
656 ("[E]motions involve cognitive assessments and possess their own form of
rationality.").
211 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 16, at 190 ("Emotions are rational.., and instantiate
over time an intelligible character.").
212 Id. at 189; see alsoPillsbury, supra note 14, at 710 ("The heart has its reasons, which
reason knows not.") (quoting BLAISE PASCAL, PFNSEES 343 (H.F. Stewart ed., 1950)).
213
214

Moore, supra note 16, at 190.
See, e.g., Deigh, supra note 210, at 836-37; cf. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, POrrcJusTIcE 65

(1995) (Pity "requires the belief that another person is suffering in a serious way through
no fault of her own.").
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Quasi-mandatory statutes require ajury to impose death if it finds
that the applicable aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating ones.
Assuming (counterfactually) that aggravating and mitigating factors
bear only on what punishment a defendant deserves, and assuming
that a defendant deserves death whenever aggravating circumstances
"outweigh" mitigating circumstances, the end result is that quasimandatory statutes require the jury to impose death whenever it is deserved.2 15 The law leaves the jury no other choice, insisting that it
honor the outcome of its own moral calculus. 21 6 Within a quasimandatory sentencing scheme, a jury that grants mercy willfully ignores the law's command. The law mandates death, but the jury,
217
moved by mercy, defies the law and imposes life.
Mercy so conceived becomes a form of jury nullification. Some
courts have expressly drawn the analogy. 2 18 Outside the sentencing
context, the law generally tolerates the practice of jury nullification,
but it does so begrudgingly. 2 19 Nullification is treated as an unfortunate consequence of the jury's power to acquit, combined with the

law's prohibition against double jeopardy and general refusal to sub-

215
See, e.g., Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 374, 386 (1990) (upholding ajury instruction requiring the imposition of the death penalty when aggravating circumstances
outweigh mitigating circumstances); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305 (1990)
(same); see also Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 651-52 (1990) (plurality opinion) (upholding an instruction that the jury shall impose death if the mitigating circumstances are insufficient to "call for leniency"). But see People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 846 (Colo. 1991) (en
banc) (plurality opinion) (invalidating on state constitutional grounds a capital statute that
mandated death when aggravators and mitigators were in equipoise).
216
Cf. Allen, supra note 53, at 733 (noting that "shall impose" language in Arizona
capital statute "merely informs a sentencer of the implications of the [capital sentencing]
process").
217 See Weisberg, supra note 16, at 326 (characterizing Lockett as "a rule of jury
nullification").
218
See Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 946 (Ind. 1994) (holding that capital sentencing
juries have right to grant mercy but that "it is improper for a court to instruct ajury that
they [sic] have a right to disregard the law"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 783 (1996); Fox v. State,
779 P.2d 562, 573 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989) (suggesting that "jury nullification" instruction
in capital cases "would inform the jury of its right to return a sentence of life no matter
how great the weight of evidence supporting the circumstances"), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1060
(1990); accordPickens v. State, 850 P.2d 328, 339 (Okla. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1100
(1994). But see Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1374 n.54 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Jury
nullification... goes to the question of [guilt]. By marked contrast, when ajury declines
to impose the death penalty ... [its decision] will not result in the defendant being set
free."), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982).
219
See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 86 F.3d 735, 736 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Jury nullification
is a fact because the government cannot appeal an acquittal; it is not a right, either of the
jury or of the defendant."); Scarpa v. Dubois, 38 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1994) ("[A]Ithough
jurors possess the raw power to set the accused free for any reason or no reason .... [w] e
do not accept the premise that jurors have the right to nullify the law on which they are
instructed .... .") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 940 (1995).
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ject acquittals to appellate review. 220 Tolerance, however, is as far as
the law is willing to go. It refuses to openly acknowledge the jury's
221
power to nullify or to otherwise lend the practice any legitimacy.
Viewed as a species of jury nullification, mercy cannot be expressly
recognized as a valid part of the penalty phase, at least not without
2 22
snubbing the rule of law.
This objection is unpersuasive. Whatever one thinks about a
jury's power to nullify the commands of the substantive criminal law,
the practice of granting mercy is importantly different. For one thing,
mercy in capital sentencing does not mean a guilty defendant goes
free. It merely means that the defendant gets less punishment than
he deserves, usually life in prison. Moreover, although the criminal
law would lack integrity if it declared something a crime and then told
jurors they were free to acquit someone guilty of that crime, the same
is not true of mercy. The law does not send contradictory signals if it
instructs jurors to impose death only if it is deserved but, at the same
time, assigns them the power to impose a lesser sentence in the name
of mercy.
5.

Executive Prerogative

A final objection to incorporating mercy into the penalty phase
looks to separation-of-powers doctrine. According to this objection,
giving juries the power to grant mercy would violate the traditional
Anglo-American view that mercy must come from the executive if it is
to come at all.22 3 In short, mercy is an executive prerogative.
At least with respect to capital sentencing, however, practice has
overtaken tradition. As explained above, the penalty phase already
permits the jury to base its sentencing decision on facts and circumstances that properly belong only to the domain of mercy. In this
limited sense, the jury already "decides" whether or not to grant
mercy. Indeed, when governors deny clemency, they sometimes justify their denial on the ground that the jury has already considered
220
See, e.g., United States v. Leach, 632 F.2d 1337, 1341 n.12 (5th Cir. 1980) ("If we
were to consider jury nullification as a basis [for appeal), we would in effect be... greatly
weakening the protection against double jeopardy.").
221
See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("Th [e]
so called right ofjury nullification ... risks ... anarchy.").
222
See generallyJack B. Weinstein, ConsideringJury "Nullification". When May and Should
aJuy Reject the Law to DoJustice. 30 AM. CRiM. L. REv,. 239, 250 (1993) (arguing against an

instruction ofjury nullification in all cases); GaryJ. Simson,Jury Nullification in the American
System: A Skeptical View, 54 TEX. L. REv. 488, 512 (1976) ("Jiurors told of their right to

nullify would often frustrate the people's sense ofjustice...."). But seeAlan Scheflin &Jon
Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, 43 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 51, 56
(Autumn 1980).
223 See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 412 (1993) (describing clemency power as

the "power to extend mercy").
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everything the condemned inmate has put forward. In essence, governors invoke a self-imposed doctrine of resjudicataand respectfully decline to second-guess the jury.2 24 Capital sentencing juies, however,
2 25

are never told that granting mercy is part of their job description.
To the extent that this objection reflects the view that mercy ought
vested exclusively in the hands of the executive, it is unrealistic
be
to
in today's world. Governors may have the power to grant mercy, but
they no longer seem willing to exercise that power in a meaningful
fashion. Faced with constituencies anxious to see capital sentences
carried out swiftly, governors simply do not grant mercy, even in cases
were mercy clearly seems appropriate.2 26 Executive clemency in the
modem era is almost nonexistent.2 27 While no defendant who has
been properly convicted and who deserves death has been treated unjustly if he is denied mercy, the decision to grant mercy should not
turn on whether an election is fast approaching. If a genuine capacity
224 Ifjurors were told that they had the power to grant mercy, this resjudicata principle
would gain some force, but it would not eliminate the need for executive clemency. Executive clemency would still be needed to consider facts and circumstances that, for whatever
reason, were never brought to the jury's attention. See, e.g., Bruce Ledewitz & Scott Staples,
The Role of Executive Clemency in Modem Death Penalty Cases, 27 U. RIcH. L. REv. 227, 234-38
(1993).
225 See, e.g., Lusk v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 946, 951 (11th Cir. 1992) ("[T]here was no
constitutional error in the trial court's refusal to consider 'mercy' in the absence of any
mitigating circumstances."), cert. denied 508 U.S. 920 (1993); Bertolotti v. Dugger, 883 F.2d
1503, 1526 (11th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he Constitution [does] not mandate an instruction explicitly authorizing the jury to... exercise its power of mercy."), cert. dnied, 497 U.S. 1032
(1990); Rieber v. State, 663 So.2d 985, 995 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (rejecting proposed
instruction that "[e]ven if you find one or more aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt ... [n]othing in the law forbids you from extending mercy"), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 531 (1995); People v. Rodrigues, 885 P.2d 1, 76 (Cal. 1994) (upholding refusal
to instruct on mercy), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 147 (1995); Thornton v. State, 449 S.E.2d 98,
114 (Ga. 1994) (upholding refusal to instruct jury that it "could impose a life sentence
based solely on mercy"); Grandison v. State, 506 A.2d 580, 616 (Md.) (holding that a mercy
instruction would be impermissible within the modem capital punishment scheme), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 873 (1986); Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289, 1331 (Miss. 1994) ("The defendant has no right to a mercy instruction."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 214 (1995); Rogers v.
State, 890 P.2d 959, 978 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) ("A life sentence may be given notwithstanding a jury finding of aggravating circumstances which outweigh mitigating circumstances, but an instruction on this point is not required."); State v. Hartman, 703 S.W.2d
106, 119 (Tenn. 1985) (holding that trial courts are not required to give jury charge on
mercy), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986).
226 See, e.g., Hugo A. Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in CapitalCases, 18 N.Y.U.
REV. L & Soc. CHANGE 255, 268 (1990); Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained:

Wresting the PardoningPowerfrom the King, 69 TEx. L. REv. 569, 607-10 (1991); Victoria J.
Palacios, Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme Court's Reliance on Commutation to Ensure Justice in
Death Penalty Cases, 49 VAD. L. REv. 311, 347-49 (1996); Michael L. Radelet & Barbara A.
Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman Capital Cases, 27 U. RcH. L. REv. 289, 304
(1993). But see Margery M. Koosed, Some Perspectives on the Possible Impact of Diminished FederalReview of Ohio'sDeath Sentences, 19 CAP. U. L. REv. 695, 782-93 (1990) (suggesting political costs of clemency may not be as great as thought).
227 See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, Inheritingthe Wind. The Supreme Court and CapitalPunishment in the 1990s, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 7, 17 (1992).
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for mercy is something a system of capital sentencing should have,
then it makes sense to place the power of mercy in the hands of the
jury.
CONCLUSION

The death penalty is a growing presence, 228 and the public's
2 29
strong support for capital punishment shows little sign of abating.
To do justice should be the first goal of the penalty phase. Death
should be imposed, if at all, only if it is deserved. The penalty phase
fails most egregiously when it permits the undeserving to be condemned. As it now stands, however, a capital defendant runs an unnecessary risk of being condemned to death because capital
sentencing juries are improperly swayed by evidence having no legitimately retributive purpose, except to weigh against a grant of mercy.
From a retributive perspective, we should wonder how many of the
3000-plus death sentences imposed since Furman v. Georgiagenuinely
23 0
represent the punishment the offender deserved.
Even if we had confidence that those sentences matched the unbending demands of justice, we might still pause. Over three hundred inmates have been executed since January 1973,231 and more
death sentences-fifty-six-were carried out last year than in any year
since 1957.232 Moreover, when we hear talk that lethal injection is
"too easy,"233 when multiple executions are performed on the same
day,2 3 4 when efforts are made to expand the death penalty to offenses
228 See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, The Romance of Revenge: CapitalPunishment in America, 13
STUD. IN L., POL. & Soc'v 71 (1993); Bilionis, supra note 27, at 285; see also Phoebe C.
Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardeningof the Attitudes: Americans' Views on the Death Penaty,
50J. Soc. IssuEs 19, 48-49 (1994) (noting consistently high support for the death penalty
in recent public opinion polls).
229 See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, §§ 60001-26, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (expanding scope of federal death penalty); 1995
N.Y. Laws 759-82 (restoring New York death penalty); Connecticut Death Penalty Law is
Toughened, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 13, 1995, at B6; David Barstow, Executions Rise Sharply as Appeals
Dry Up, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Dec. 12, 1995, at A12; FederalGovernment Set to ResumeExecutions, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 14, 1995, atA26; Kathy Walt, Bush Signs Bill To Speed Executions, Limit
Parole, HOUSTON CHRON., June 8, 1995, at 32A; Jack Wardlaw, Death Penaltyfor Child Rape
Gets Final OK, NEw ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 6, 1995, at A4.
230 Death Row, U.S.A., supranote 21, at 1.
231

Id.

232 Richard Carelli, U.S. Executions Highest Sine 1957, PORTLAND OREGONAN, Dec. 30,
1995, at A14. Texas took the lead. See States Executed 56 in '95, with Texas in the Lead,
DALuAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 30, 1995, at 5A. Executions in the United States peaked in

the mid-1930s, tapered off through the mid-1960s, and began to rise again starting in
1980. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supranote 22, at 27.
233 Man's Execution "Too Easy," Says Victim 's Mother, ST. Louis DISPATCH, Nov. 23, 1995,
at 70.
234 See Peter Baker, KillerExecuted After Allen Rejects Plea; Virginia Carries Out Fourth Death
Sentence in ThreeMonths, WASH. PosrJan. 5, 1996, at B3; 2nd Inmate in 2 days Dies in Florida's
Electric Chair,ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 6, 1995, at D3; Michael Graczyk, Texas Puts to Death
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in which no one is killed, 23 5 and when the once-Great Writ of habeas
corpus continues to shrink, 236 the time is ripe to take stock. We
should remind ourselves that while justice is the first and crowning
jewel of the virtues, it is not the only one. There is another, which
falls as a "gentle rain from heaven... twice blest."

lst Asian Executed in U.S. in 19 Years, DALLAS MoRmW GNEWS, Dec. 8, 1995, at 28A; KillersPut
to Death in Foridaand Missouri, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 6, 1995, at A3; Don Terry, 2 Executions in
Illinois, Rarity There, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1995, at A21; 2 Texas Killers Are Executed in 88
Minutes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1995, at A19; Virginia and North CarolinaPutKillers to Death, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1995, at A14.
235
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42C (West 1996) (aggravated rape of victim under age
12 punishable by death or life imprisonment).
236 Habeas corpus is the procedural vehicle by which state.:sentenced inmates challenge the constitutionality of their convictions and sentences in federal court. For critical

examinations of the Court's recent habeas revolution, see, e.g., LARRYYACKLE, RECLAIMING
THE FEDERAL COURTS 151-214 (1994); Marc M. Arkin, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the

LowerFederalCourts After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. REv. 371 (1991); Susan Bandes, Taking
Justice to its Logical Extreme: A Comment on Teague v. Lane, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2453 (1993);
Vivian Berger, Herrera v. Collins: The Gateway of Innocencefor Death-SentencedPrisonersLeads
Nowhere, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 943, 1009-23 (1994); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J.
Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1731
(1991); Barry Friedman, FailedEnterprise: The Supreme Court'sHabeasRefom, 83 CAL. L. REv.
485, 528 (1995); Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45 VAND. L. REv. 797, 800-01 (1992);
Barry Friedman, Pas de Deux: The Supreme Court and the Habeas Courts, 66 S. CAl. L. REv.
2467, 2479-92 (1993); Evan Tsen Lee, The Theories of Federal Habeas Corpus, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 151, 156-77 (1994); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time': The AnachronisticAttack
on Habeas Corpus/DirectReview Parity,92 COLUM. L. REv. 1997 (1992); James S. Liebman,
More Than "Slightly Retro:" The Rehnquist Court's Rout ofHabeas CorpusJurisdictionin Teague v.
Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 537 (1990-1991); DanielJ. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction:The Limits of Models, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2507 (1993); Kathleen Patchel, The New
Habeas, 42 HASTINGS LJ. 939 (1991); Yale L. Rosenberg, KaddishforHabeasCorpus, 59 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 362 (1991); Jordan Steiker, Innocence and FederalHabeas, 41 UCLA L. REv.
303, 320-88 (1993); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 642-44, 575,
(1993).
For more positive assessments, see, e.g., Patrick E. Higginbotham, Notes on Teague, 66
S. CAL. L. REv. 2433 (1994); Joseph L. Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the
Revolution, 1994 Sup. CT. REv. 65.
Congress has recently entered the fray with its own amendments to the federal habeas
corpus statute. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). See.generallyLarry W. Yackle, A Primeron the New Habeas Corpus
Statute; 44 BuFF. L. REv. 381 (1996).

